Antislavery Women and the Origins of American Jurisprudence


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“Antislavery Women and the Origins of American Jurisprudence” is a Review of Sarah Roth’s Gender and Race in Antebellum Popular Culture (Cambridge University Press, 2014). It assesses Roth’s account of the dialogue between antislavery and proslavery writers. Roth finds that the antislavery and proslavery writers were joined in their depiction of enslaved people in the 1820s and early 1830s—as savage people who threatened rebellion. But as antislavery writers shifted to portray enslaved people as humble citizens in waiting, the proslavery writers responded with an image of the plantation as a family. This critique turns to Southern judges and treatise writers to provide a slightly different picture, which shows that while the public face of the proslavery movement may have been of happy enslaved people, the hard-nosed economic and legal side continued with the initial image of enslaved people. This became particularly salient as the South moved toward the Civil War. Roth perceptively portrays the shift in the North that led to increasing calls for African-American freedom and citizenship and the rise of empirical critiques of law, which became central to postwar jurisprudence. That is, the antislavery white women in Roth’s study injected empirical as well as humanitarian considerations into jurisprudence. Meanwhile, in the Southern courts the reaction to calls for citizenship resulted in increasingly dramatic efforts to deny citizenship and ultimately in a secession movement along the lines sketched by Southern legal thinkers.

The truth is, the abolitionist can make the slave a brute or a saint, just as it may happen to suit the exigency of his argument. If slavery degrades its subjects into brutes, then one would suppose that slaves are brutes. But the moment you speak of selling a slave, he is no longer a brute,—he is a civilized man, with all the most tender

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affections, with all the most generous emotions. If the object be to excite indignation against slavery, then it always transforms its subjects into brutes; but if it be to excite indignation against the slaveholder, then he holds, not brutes, but a George Harris—or an Eliza—or an Uncle Tom—in bondage.¹

Introduction

After the Civil War, Harriet Beecher Stowe recalled that on meeting President Lincoln, he said, “So you’re the little woman who wrote the book that made this great war!”² While Lincoln scholars think that may have been apocryphal, it suggests a theme that Sarah Nelson Roth explores in depth in *Gender and Race in Antebellum Popular Culture*: how antislavery writers, largely female novelists, remade the image of enslaved men and thus set the stage for rethinking about freedom and citizenship for enslaved people. Their influence went beyond ideas of citizenship, though—they provided a critique of the dominant considerations of utility and of historical jurisprudence. And they led the way for expanded utilitarian calculations and for the post-Civil War critique of historical jurisprudence popularized by Oliver Wendell Holmes.

In the thirty years leading into the Civil War, antislavery writers—often affluent, white women—dramatically changed their depiction of enslaved men. In the 1830s, their case for the abolition of slavery was based on the image of enslaved men as savage beasts.³ If such people were not freed, the United States risked a servile war and bloodshed that rivaled the revolution in Haiti.⁴ By the early 1850s, antislavery writers had changed their depiction of enslaved men. Instead of savage beasts, enslaved men were refined citizens who were being denied their rights as members of civil society.⁵ Proslavery Southerners, especially politicians and judges, had to respond to that powerful imagery. Proslavery writers changed their depiction of enslaved men. Instead of portraying them as brutes, enslaved people were depicted as members of the family of slave owners, people who were not yet ready to be citizens.⁶ And then as the

⁴. Id. at 38–45.
⁵. Id. at 74–104 (explaining that during the 1840s the savagery and aggression that had epitomized the portrayal of slaves began to wane); id. at 105–40 (outlining the shift toward depicting slaves as martyrs).
⁶. Id. at 141–65 (discussing the rise of anti-Uncle Tom’s Cabin novels in the 1850s).
Civil War loomed, antislavery writers moved enslaved men up the next rung on the ladder of freedom: to citizens.\(^7\)

Sarah Roth tells the story of this dialogue between antislavery and proslavery forces, which had such momentous implications for constitutional law. Significantly, it took place largely between antislavery women and proslavery men—often lawyers and judges.\(^8\) This is an important story for several reasons. First, it reveals the ways elite white women changed the nature of political and legal debate on a central issue of our nation’s existence. It reveals the sophisticated ideas of antislavery legal thinkers with respect to citizenship and freedom. Second, it reveals the ways antislavery women and proslavery men responded to each other. It shows there was a dialogue between antislavery and proslavery ideas and that the antislavery ideas, often embraced by women, exercised a gravitational pull on the proslavery ideas. This is a dialogue in which fiction engaged proslavery judicial opinions and, more obliquely, those judicial opinions engaged the growing antislavery values. Thus, it relocates women to the center of constitutional thought and action in the pre-Civil War era. Finally, this reveals the power of ideas of citizenship and how difficult it was for proslavery ideas to effectively respond to the growing imagery that enslaved people should be treated as humans. That is, Roth reveals the power of antislavery imagery for political and legal thought leading into and during the Civil War.

Roth draws on a number of sources, such as the antislavery novel *Uncle Tom’s Cabin;*\(^9\) a novel written by a member of the Georgia Supreme Court,\(^10\) political theory published by Southern university professors\(^11\) and Southern white women;\(^12\) and even science fiction written by proslavery Southerners.\(^13\) Roth’s framework of the growing desire for African-

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7. *Id.* at 207–46 (describing radical abolitionists’ literary depictions in the 1850s of black males as revolutionaries).

8. See, e.g., *Id.* at 7 (noting the role of white, antislavery women in remaking images of black masculinity); *Id.* at 11 (noting the role of a proslavery man in responding to the antislavery writers).


American citizenship in the North and the shifting images of enslaved people in the South is very useful for understanding the evolution of legal and political thought in the thirty years leading into the Civil War.

Judicial opinions, however, are notable by their absence in this book, for judicial opinions are a particularly important source for gauging the proslavery attitudes in concrete settings. Roth’s framework correlates with what was happening in state legislatures and also in the Southern judiciary. It helps us make sense of a series of cases in Southern courts in which judges discussed slaves’ character. Those cases include attempts by testators to emancipate enslaved people, suits by owners and renters of slaves for the torts committed by slaves against strangers, suits by slaves claiming rights to freedom following travel in free states, and even criminal prosecutions of white people for abusing slaves and, conversely, against slaves for attacking owners, renters, and strangers. Southern judges’ rhetoric about slave personality shifted along the lines Roth describes from the 1820s to the mid-1850s. But as the Civil War approached in the late 1850s, Southern judges were writing again in dramatic terms about men of African descent as savages. That is, as they prepared for war, their rhetoric turned to describing enslaved men as savages who had the power to wreak havoc and maybe even destroy the white, slave-owning South. Thus, a comparison of Roth’s framework against Southern judicial opinions confirms that the judges were thinking and writing in terms very similar to the rest of the proslavery South. This confirms the close connections between judicial and cultural thought.

At points, however, judicial and popular thought diverged. Those are places where the economic imperative of slavery required a result that was at odds with the myth of paternalism that slave owners told themselves. Those points of disjuncture between the judicial doctrine and Southern popular culture reveal the places where the economic, demographic, and social realities of slavery were different from the idealized myths of the plantation. Roth provides an excellent framework for thinking about the sine curve of proslavery Southern thought from 1830 to 1860, especially in the judiciary.

In this Review, I have three goals: first, to assess the trajectory that Roth plots; second, to suggest the utility of that plot to understanding judicial behavior while also suggesting how judicial opinions modify somewhat Roth’s story of the image of enslaved Africans held by proslavery Southerners. Finally, I ask questions about causation in this

14. See infra subpart III(A).
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
story, such as the role of enslaved Africans and recently freed Africans in
the changes described here as opposed to the role of white, female Northern
writers. In that later line, I have two questions. First, while Roth describes
well the changes in public images, I am unclear about the chain of
causation. Moreover, in the South there was resistance by courts to the
abolitionists’ redefinition of slaves as citizens in waiting. The black image
in the Southern judicial mind, to paraphrase historians writing on this time,
reveals that Southern judges were deeply engaged in the creation of the
public attitudes towards enslaved people and that those images drew upon
popular culture.17 But those judges also departed from popular culture
when necessary to develop a law based on hard-edged economic principles
and to deny enslaved people citizenship rights. Those judges turned to the
images of enslaved people as savages rather than as children and, in that
way, departed from the popular culture that Roth details. Thus, I have two
questions about whether Roth describes the causative factors in the North
and South in translating public images of enslaved Africans into court
opinions and legislative action. But whatever one’s assessment of the
causation, on which there should be more investigation, Roth’s Northern,
antislavery writers inject key issues into American jurisprudence, such as a
deep reverence for empirical arguments (such as those based on an
observation of the effect of slave law), as well as skepticism of historical
thought and of natural law arguments based on hierarchy observed in
nature.

I. The Trajectory of Antislavery Imagery of Enslaved People

Roth plots a trajectory that begins in the 1820s as antislavery writers
depicted enslaved men as savages.18 Their idea was to depict enslaved
people as dangerous and to scare slave owners into believing that if they did
not free slaves there would be rebellion.19 In fact, one of the most radical
antislavery books ever published, David Walker’s Appeal to the Coloured
Citizens of the World, threatened rebellion and urged slaves to take the lives
of their owners.20 For instance, in the wake of the August 1831 Nat Turner
rebellion, one tract published shortly after the rebellion turned to the
destruction of the slaves to encourage readers to take action against

17. See generally MIA BAY, THE WHITE IMAGE IN THE BLACK MIND: AFRICAN-AMERICAN
IDEAS ABOUT WHITE PEOPLE, 1830–1925 (2000); GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE
IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817–1914
(Wesleyan Ed. 1987).
18. ROTI, supra note 3, at 38–73.
19. Id. at 44–48.
20. See generally DAVID WALKER, APPEAL TO THE COLOURED CITIZENS OF THE WORLD
(Bos., David Walker rev. ed. 1830) (calling for slaves to revolt against their masters).
slavery. While the book was an account of the rebellion, readers could leave it thinking that the rebellion was in some ways understandable, perhaps even justified. The imagery shifted around the 1840s toward enslaved people as Christians and citizens. Harriet Beecher Stowe’s *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* is the most famous of this literature, but some of the antislavery legal literature engaged with this as well, such as William Goodell’s *The American Slave Code in Theory and Practice*, which turned to an empirical study of the system of slavery based largely on newspaper accounts of runaway slaves, as well as an intensive study of judicial opinions to map out the inhumanity of the slave code. It was, as its title indicates, both an empirical and theoretical analysis, and thus, part of the utilitarian calculations so ubiquitous in pre-Civil War political and legal thought.

In addition to the empirical attack on slavery, which argued that the harms of slavery outweighed the benefits, there was also a powerful attack from the vantage of humanitarian considerations for the enslaved. In an 1851 address at Concord, Massachusetts, Ralph Waldo Emerson advanced an alternative interpretation of law, which might admit of some antislavery sentiments. Emerson urged that the higher law, then so commonly invoked in antislavery circles, was part of the common law. Contrary to what many lawyers said, Emerson reported that his research showed support for the higher law: “A few months ago, in my dismay at hearing that the Higher Law was reckoned a good joke in the courts, I took pains to look into a few law-books.” He looked for signs that “immoral laws are void” and found that “the great jurists, Cicero, Grotius, Coke, Blackstone, Burlamaqui, Montesquieu, Vattel, Burke, Mackintosh, Jefferson, do all affirm this.” Yet, Emerson did not cite passages from those authors in

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21. Roth, supra note 3, at 50–51 (discussing Samuel Warner’s AUTHENTIC AND IMPARTIAL NARRATIVE OF THE TRAGICAL SCENE WHICH WAS WITNESSED IN SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY (VIRGINIA) (N.Y., Warner & West 1831)).

22. Id.

23. Roth, supra note 3, at 74–78.


27. Id.

28. Id.

29. Id.
defense of his argument, for “no reasonable person needs a quotation from Blackstone to convince him that white cannot be legislated to be black.”

Soon there would be a novel affirming Emerson’s belief.

Harriet Beecher Stowe advanced a jurisprudence of sentiment in three works. She began with *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, which portrayed the horrors of slavery and, in particular, the hazards of the law’s support for owners at the expense of slaves. This was followed shortly by her nonfiction *A Key to Uncle Tom’s Cabin*. A section of that book focused on Southern judicial opinions. North Carolina Supreme Court Justice Thomas Ruffin’s *State v. Mann* decision received the largest attention. Stowe turned to it as an example of cold, legal logic. Ruffin, according to Stowe, did not listen to the human voice in drafting his opinion; instead, he applied cold logic to the issue. It was this cold logic that led to so many perverse conclusions:

Every act of humanity of every individual owner is an illogical result from the legal definition; and the reason why the slave-code of America is more atrocious than any ever before exhibited under the sun, is that the Anglo-Saxon race are a more coldly and strictly logical race, and have an unflinching courage to meet the consequences of every premise which they lay down, and to work out an accursed principle, with mathematical accuracy, to its most accursed results. The decisions in American law-books, show nothing so much as this severe, unflinching accuracy of logic.

The third book in Stowe’s antislavery trilogy, *Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp*, had a fictional character based on Justice Ruffin. That fictional jurist was antislavery in private, but felt compelled by law to issue a proslavery decision. Like *State v. Mann*, the opinion freed a man from liability (although this time it was civil liability) for abusing a slave in his custody. When asked by his wife whether he must issue the decision, the judge said:

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30. *Id.*
33. *Id.* at 124–77.
34. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1830).
35. *See Stowe, supra* note 32, at 144–48 (describing *State v. Mann*, in which the defendant’s conviction of cruelly and unwarrantedly punishing a slave not his own was overturned on the grounds that he, the slave’s renter, had the same rights as the master to injure the slave, and bemoaning the fact that Judge Ruffin appeared to follow the law instead of his conscience).
36. *Id.*
37. *Id.* at 155.
40. *Id.* at 102–03.
A judge can only perceive and declare. What I see, I must speak, though it go against all my feelings and all my sense of right... I sit in my seat, not to make laws, nor to alter them, but simply to declare what they are... I have sworn truly to declare the laws, and I must keep my oath.\footnote{Id. at 99–100.}

While that is a fictional account—in which a critic of the Southern judicial system constructed a character—it gives a sense of how people at the time interpreted what judges were doing.\footnote{Stowe engaged in an explicit debate with proslavery judges. \textit{Stowe}, supra note 32, at 147–48 (discussing Justice Thomas Ruffin’s opinion in \textit{State v. Mann} and asking why he was “merely an expositor, and not a reformer of law”); Judge John Bolton O’Neall, Letter to the Editor, \textit{N.Y. DAILY TRIB.}, Aug. 15, 1853, at 6 (discussing legal errors in Stowe’s \textit{A Key to Uncle Tom’s Cabin}).}

One of the most powerful critiques of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act was that it deprived slaves of rights of citizenship and tended to take away those rights of citizenship from others. Henry David Thoreau, responding to the Act’s requirements that Massachusetts citizens assist with the return of fugitive slaves, said on July 4, 1854, that “there are perhaps a million slaves in Massachusetts.”\footnote{Henry David Thoreau, Address at the Anti-Slavery Celebration at Framingham: Slavery in Massachusetts (July 4, 1854), \textit{reprinted in Thoreau: Political Writings} 123 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1996).}

As cases of fugitive slaves began to appear in courts, the debates increasingly took on the question about whether individuals should actively stop rendition of fugitive slaves. The most famous case arose in Boston in 1854 when Anthony Burns was arrested as a fugitive slave, and after Judge Edward Loring ordered him returned, abolitionists set about plans to free him.\footnote{See, e.g., \textit{JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE, THE RENDITION OF ANTHONY BURNS: ITS CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES} 13–17 (Crosby, Nichols & Co. 1854) (describing the judgment and the immediate aftermath in Boston).} President Franklin Pierce employed federal troops to make sure that Burns was put on a ship to return to Virginia.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at xii–xiii (discussing the negative public reaction to the rendition of fugitive slaves).}

Burns’s trial brought home to many the odious obligations that law imposed.\footnote{\textit{See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS} (1975); \textit{MARK V. TUSHINET, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V. MANN IN HISTORY AND LITERATURE} 38–65 (2003).} And while some courts found creative ways to avoid the law, most commonly and most importantly they followed it.\footnote{Thoreau, \textit{supra} note 43, at 124.} Thoreau was led to ask in the wake of Anthony Burns’s trial, “Does any one think that Justice or God awaits Mr. Loring’s decision?” When enslaved people were seen as citizens, the distance that needed to be traveled to freedom was short.
II. The Image of the Enslaved Person in Southern Legal Thought

The proslavery literature in the 1820s and 1830s had the same imagery of enslaved men as the antislavery literature, but drew different results from it. That proslavery literature, especially works like William & Mary College Professor Thomas R. Dew’s pamphlet responding to Nat Turner’s rebellion, continued to view enslaved people (particularly men) as savages who needed to be controlled to prevent rebellion.49 But in the 1840s and especially 1850s, the proslavery literature began to respond to the antislavery literature that saw enslaved people as humans deserving the rights of citizens.50 That proslavery literature then tried to emphasize the familial aspects of slavery.51 Works like Thomas R.R. Cobb’s *An Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery* tried to balance the images of enslaved people as dangerous rebels (who needed to be controlled) against images of loyal enslaved people who were not yet ready for citizenship.52

The political theory popular among white Southerners in the 1850s hewed to that line. Instead of emphasizing Enlightenment principles of universal freedom and rights, the political theory of the 1850s emphasized inequality and taught that people were only entitled to rights according to where they were on the scale of civilization.53 The novels published in response to *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* routinely emphasize the point of African-American inferiority and thus add further support to the premise behind the proslavery political theory.54 It was a political theory grounded in Aristotle, as University of Virginia law professor James P. Holcombe acknowledged in a speech to the state agricultural fair in Petersburg, Virginia.55

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49. THOMAS R. DEW, REVIEW OF THE DEBATE IN THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE OF 1831 AND 1832, at 6–7 (Richmond, T.W. White 1832).
50. ROTH, supra note 3, at 141–65.
51. Id. at 152–56.
52. The conflicts of the two visions of enslaved people appear in THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ccxii (Univ. of Ga. Press 1999) (1858), which portrays enslaved people as improving morally and physically under the discipline of Southern owners while on the same page discussing the “moral weaknesses of the native Ebo.” See also Holmes, Observations on a Passage, supra note 11, at 193 (expanding on Aristotle’s position that “[n]ature has clearly designed some men for freedom and others for slavery;—and with respect to the latter, slavery is both just and beneficial”).
53. See JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, ADDRESS OF JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, ESQ.: DELIVERED BEFORE THE PHOENIX AND PHILOMATHEAN SOCIETIES, OF WILLIAM AND MARY COLLEGE 11 (Richmond, Chas. H. Wynne 1854) (noting, for example, that “it is possible for the citizens of each country in the world to be free to the highest degree which its social condition will permit, and yet the citizen of one will be far less free than those of others . . . . [T]he maximum of liberty possible in different nations, is very different, as a result of the social elements composing them”).
54. See ROTH, supra note 3, at 141–65.
Justice Ebenezer Starnes of the Georgia Supreme Court responded to Stowe and to empirical critiques of slavery, such as Goodell’s *American Slave Code in Theory and Practice*, by conducting his own empirical studies of crimes committed by enslaved people and free people of African descent and by writing a proslavery novel, *The Slaveholder Abroad*.\(^{56}\) While Starnes’s work was a weak rebuttal of the antislavery critiques, it shows that just as the antislavery novelists and lawyers were responding to proslavery jurists, the proslavery jurists were responding to those critiques. Another response came from South Carolina Justice John Belton O’Neall, whose treatise listed the restrictions that South Carolina law imposed on owners in abusing their slaves.\(^{57}\) More frequently, judges relegated decisions regarding the treatment of slaves to the conscience of their owners, for whatever that was worth.\(^{58}\)

Beyond the common law, those writing on political theory emphasized hierarchy rather than equality. Slavery was part of the natural order, they argued, in which some labored for others.\(^{59}\) In this way proslavery Southerners joined their belief that slavery was nearly ubiquitous in human history and that when slavery ended in the West Indies it led to demographic and economic disaster for the slave-owning class.\(^{60}\) It was a political theory of hierarchy and order that was in keeping with their understanding of history and contemporary society and their economic best interest.\(^{61}\) Together they were debating law on the grounds of empiricism and sentiment while forming an American jurisprudence concerned with empiricism, historicism, and debate about the obligations that the rule of law imposed on government officials and private citizens.\(^{62}\)

Southerners understood the power of appeals to humanity that were increasingly made by the abolitionists. The Southern proslavery response changed the image of enslaved Africans. Where once the talk had been of the virtues of slavery for the slave-owning part of society, such as how it

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\(^{56}\) STARNES, supra note 10, app. at 465–512.

\(^{57}\) JOHN BELTON O’NEALL, THE NEGRO LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA 13 (Columbia, John G. Bowman 1848).

\(^{58}\) See, e.g., H. N. McTyeire, *Master and Servant, in Duties of Masters to Servants: Three Premium Essays* 7, 8 (Charleston, S. Baptist Publ’n Soc’y 1851) (describing the duty a master owes his slaves as “binding upon the conscience” and equal in weight to the duty a master would owe any human).

\(^{59}\) Holcombe, supra note 55, at 403–04.

\(^{60}\) COBB, supra note 52, at cxcvi–cc.

\(^{61}\) BLEDSOE, supra note 1, at 263–64. See generally TUCKER, supra note 53.

made democracy possible, by the 1850s the proslavery side needed a response to the growing sense that enslaved people were citizens in waiting who were being deprived of their rights and humanity. The proslavery response shifted course somewhat from the imagery of enslaved men as beasts to enslaved people as docile members of a plantation family. Thus, the response focused on enslaved people as “family” members and at the same time made the point in increasing amplitude that enslaved people cannot be citizens. That was the response in the legal literature of the proslavery South.

III. The Salience of Judicial Imagery of Enslaved People

There was another response by Southern judges, which raises the question: How much can Roth’s framework help us understand what judges were doing? Several central questions emerge from her narrative in regard to the Southern judiciary. First, how much does the imagery tell us about Southern legal thought? Did judges reflect the changing images of enslaved people? Did judges contribute anything to the changing imagery? That is, what does Roth’s discussion of the changing ideas about enslaved people tell us about the judiciary, legal doctrine, and the ways that antislavery advocates responded to proslavery legal thought? This is a question as we try to locate law at the center of American history. By turning to a series of doctrines, this section illustrates that judges employed the imagery of enslaved people (particularly men) as savages at many points; at other points the imagery was of enslaved people as devious or manipulative. At other points judges responded, most notably in the Dred Scott v. Sandford decision and the cases from 1857 to the beginning of the Civil War in 1861, to the antislavery image of enslaved men as citizens. Through four areas—cases where testators tried to free slaves via will, suits brought against owners or renters for the torts slaves committed, suits for freedom based on travel in a free state (or emancipation by an owner in a free state), and the criminal prosecutions of slaves—this section suggests the points of divergence between the imagery of slaves in popular culture in the

63. See, e.g., Nathaniel Beverley Tucker, A Note to Blackstone’s Commentaries, 1 S. LITERARY MESSENGER 227, 230 (1835); A. P. Upshur, Domestic Slavery, 5 S. LITERARY MESSENGER 677, 679 (1839).

64. COBB, supra note 52, at ccxvii–ccxix. To be sure, there were also elements of an earlier defense of slavery that it promoted a spirit of independence among white people, even nonslaveholders. See id. at xxxix.

65. Id. at ccxvii–ccxix, 316–17.

66. See generally, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, 1 LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM THE COLONIAL YEARS THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR (2012).

67. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
proslavery South and the more economically oriented decisions of pro-
slavery jurisprudence.

A. Emancipation via Will

One way of gauging the shifting judicial ideas about enslaved Africans
is to examine cases involving emancipation, for emancipation challenged
the continuing strength of slavery. The cases reveal that judges
increasingly tightened controls over slaves.68 Perhaps the best place to
gauge the shifting ideas is Georgia, where Chief Justice Joseph Henry
Lumpkin decided emancipation cases for nearly fifteen years before the
Civil War.69 In Vance v. Crawford,70 Lumpkin first upheld a will that
ordered slaves taken outside the state and emancipated.71 Lumpkin found
such a provision consistent with Georgia’s statutes, though he condemned
emanicipation as injuring slaves, the Georgia state, and families.72 Lumpkin
concluded that the family was the origin of all societies and that
emanicipation injured families; thus, wills providing for emanicipation
should not be given favor.73

Over the next dozen years, Lumpkin revisited other emanicipation
schemes via will and increasingly criticized them.74 Sometimes slaves were
not freed despite a will ordering them taken outside of the state and freed,
as happened in Adams v. Bass,75 where the testator ordered slaves taken to
Indiana and freed.76 Indiana at that time did not allow this, and so the
slaves reverted to the residuary beneficiaries, the testator’s nephews and
nieces.77 Lumpkin rejected a cy pres argument that might have allowed the

68. For instance, Virginia made it increasingly difficult to free slaves via will in the decades
before the Civil War. At the end of the eighteenth century, it upheld a will from 1776 that granted
slaves the choice of freedom if emancipation became legal (which it did in 1782). See Pleasants v.
Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call.) 319, 340–43 (1799). By 1858, the Virginia Court of Appeals invalidated
a will that offered slaves the choice of freedom outside the state or continued slavery. Bailey v.
Poindexter, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 132 (1858). Such choice was seen as inconsistent with the status of
slavery. Id. at 199–203.

70. 4 Ga. 445 (1848).
71. Id. at 452, 458 (upholding a will provision that provided for quasi-freedom for a slave
called Ishmael).
72. Id. at 460.
73. Id.
(1854).
75. 18 Ga. 130 (1855).
76. Id. at 131.
77. Id. at 138. A dissent by Judge Benning argued that the entire will was invalid and that the
testator’s intestate heirs, not the residuary beneficiaries who were nephews and nieces, should
inherit. Id. at 147.
slaves to be taken somewhere other than Indiana, for he thought such emancipations were bad for the enslaved. 78

This policy of respecting a testator’s wishes but not adding to them continued in Cleland v. Waters. 79 In the first of the two Cleland cases, the court construed a will as providing for freeing the testator’s slaves even though there appeared to be some language missing, 80 for apparently the will had been imperfectly copied from another precedent. 81 Here Lumpkin expressed support for slavery and opposition to emancipation:

Thanks to the blind zealots of the North, for their unwarrantable interference with this institution. It has roused the public mind to thorough investigation of the subject. The result is, a settled conviction that it was wisely ordained by a forecast high as heaven above man’s, for the good of both races, and a calm and fixed determination to preserve and defend it, at any and all hazards. 82

In the second Cleland opinion, Lumpkin gave effect to the testator’s will that allowed slaves to choose between slavery and freedom (as long as the emancipation took place outside the state), while a dissenting judge interpreted Georgia statutes to prohibit emancipation in any way. 83 Lumpkin, though clearly proslavery, permitted a very mildly antislavery interpretation of the law, for he was upholding in some ways an antislavery law. 84 Lumpkin referred repeatedly to resolutions in the Georgia Senate in 1827 about the hazards of the American Colonization Society. 85 He thought slaves should not be free because this led to insubordination by slaves in the state. 86 This was a case where a judge’s proslavery sentiments were trumped by a law that was not quite so proslavery:

I am fully persuaded that the best interests of the slave, as well as a stern public policy, resulting from the whole frame-work of our social system, imperatively demand that all post mortem manumission of slaves should be absolutely and entirely prohibited. Slavery is a cherished institution in Georgia—founded in the Constitution and laws of the United States; in her own Constitution and laws, and guarded, protected and defended by the whole spirit of her legislation; approved by her people; intimately interwoven with her

78. Id. at 135–37.
79. 16 Ga. 496 (1854).
80. Id. at 500.
81. Id. at 505.
82. Id. at 514.
84. Id. at 43.
86. Cleland, 19 Ga. at 44.
present and permanent prosperity. Her interests, her feelings, her judgment and her conscience—not to say her very existence, alike conspire to sustain and perpetuate it.87

Lumpkin wanted to restrict the owner’s rights to dispose of property via will. He asked:

[W]hen the owner has kept them as long as he can enjoy them, shall he, from an ignorance of the scriptural basis upon which the institution of slavery rests, or from a total disregard to the peace and welfare of the community which survive him, invoke the aid of the Courts of this State to carry into execution his false and fatal views of humanity? Is not every agitation of these cases in our Courts attended with mischief? Is not every exode of slaves from the interior to the seaboard, thence to be transported to a land of freedom, productive of evil? Can any doubt its tendency? Are there not now in our midst large gangs of slaves who expected emancipation by the will of their owners, and who believe they have been unjustly deprived of the boon?88

Lumpkin was finding new bases for limiting emancipation89 and followed Mississippi’s similar decision from the previous year.90 He then explained his own progression from advocate of gradual emancipation to opponent of emancipation.91 The trajectory of Lumpkin’s thought paralleled that of the South more generally and of Roth’s subjects:

I was once, in common with the great body of my fellow citizens of the South, the friend and patron of this enterprise. I now regard it as a failure, if not something worse; as I do every effort that has been made, for the abolition of negro slavery, at home or abroad. Liberia was formed of emancipated slaves, many of them partially trained and prepared for the change, and sent thousands of miles from all contact with the superior race; and given a home in a country where their ancestors were natives, and supposed to be suited to their physical condition. Arrived there, they have been for a number of years in a state of pupilage to the Colonization Society, in order that they might learn “to walk alone and by themselves.” And at the end

87. Id. at 43.
88. Id. at 43–44.
89. For instance, in American Colonization Society v. Gartrell, 23 Ga. 448 (1857), Lumpkin concluded that the American Colonization Society did not have the authority in its charter to take slaves and then free them. It was limited to helping colonize free people. Id. at 450–51. Therefore, Lumpkin invalidated a devise of slaves to the Society: “[W]hile the Courts might decline to interfere, to prevent the execution of such a trust, they might consistently and without involving any absurdity, refuse to intervene, to compel its execution.” Id. at 458.
90. Lusk v. Lewis, 32 Miss. 297, 299, 302 (1856) (holding that a bequest “made in secret trust for emancipation” came “within the prohibition of [Mississippi’s] Statute of 1842, and the bequests must, therefore, be declared illegal and void”).
of a half a century what do we see? A few thousand thriftless, lazy semi-savages, dying of famine, because they will not work! To inculcate care and industry upon the descendants of Ham, is to preach to the idle winds. To be the “servant of servants” is the judicial curse pronounced upon their race. And this Divine decree is irreversible. . . . Under the superior race and nowhere else, do they attain to the highest degree of civilization; and any experiment, whether made in the British West India Islands, the coast of Africa, or elsewhere, will demonstrate that it is a vain thing for fanaticism, a false philanthropy, or anything else, to fight against the Almighty. . . . Let our women and old men, and persons of weak and infirm minds, be disabused of the false and unfounded notion that slavery is sinful, and that they will peril their souls if they do not disinherit their offspring by emancipating their slaves!92

Lumpkin enforced a mildly antislavery law despite his obvious and growing proslavery sentiments.

In 1860, the Georgia court faced another permutation that permitted slaves to choose to go to a free state and be emancipated or to select their owner in Georgia.93 Justice Lyon found this unacceptable, for it admitted of a shadow land that was part slave and part free.

No man can create a new species of property unknown to the law. No man is allowed to introduce nomalies into the ranks under which the population of the State is ranged and classified by its Constitution and laws. It is for the master to determine whether to continue to treat his slaves as property, as chattels, or in the mode prescribed by law, to manumit them, and thus place them in that class of persons to which the freed negroes of the State are assigned. Be he can not impart to his slaves, as such, for any period, the rights of freedmen. He can not endow, with powers of such import as are claimed for the slaves; here, persons whose status or condition in legal definition and intendment exists in the denial to them of any social or civil capacity whatever.94

This was part of drawing yet further distinctions between freedom and slavery. The point here is that the images of enslaved people Lumpkin used were in distinction to those advanced in Southern popular culture of enslaved people as child-like family members. Lumpkin, in contrast, saw enslaved people as rebels in waiting.

92. Id.
94. Id. at 261 (quoting Bailey v. Poindexter, 55 Va. (14 Grat.) 132, 197–98 (1858)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B. Tort Suits Against Slave Owners and Renters of Slaves

Justice Ruffin relied on his understanding of slave personality in civil cases as well. In *Heathcock v. Pennington*, Ruffin wrote of the ordinary duty of care required of people who rented slaves: “[A] slave, being a moral and intelligent being, is usually as capable of self preservation as other persons. Hence, the same constant oversight and control are not requisite for his preservation, as for that of a lifeless thing, or of an irrational animal.” Ruffin, then, absolved an operator of a mine shaft of liability to his owner for the death of a young slave who was employed there and had, late at night, fallen into the shaft and died. The mine had to keep operating twenty-four hours a day, and “some one had necessarily to perform this service at those times”:

No one could suppose, that the boy, knowing the place and its dangers, would incur the risk of stumbling into the shaft by not keeping wide awake. It was his misfortune to resemble the soldier sleeping at his post, who pays the penalty by being surprised and put to death. The event is to be attributed to one of those mishances, to which all are more or less exposed, and not, in particular, to the want of care by the defendant.

Similarly, in *Parham v. Blackwelder*, Ruffin further explored the nature of slaves’ personalities and the law’s need to decouple an owner’s liability from torts committed by her slaves. *Parham* arose when a slave owned by Amelia Parham cut wood and carried it away from Elizabeth Blackwelder’s property. There was no precedent supporting owners’ liability for the intentional torts of their slaves. Ruffin found that there was no liability, given the nature and extent of slavery:

> [W]e believe the law does not hold one person answerable for the wrongs of another person. It would be most dangerous and unreasonable if it did, as it is impossible for society to subsist without some persons being in the service of others, and it would put employers entirely in the power of those who have often, no good will to them, to ruin them.

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95. 33 N.C. (11 Ired.) 640 (1850).
96. *Id.* at 643.
97. *Id.* at 646.
98. *Id.*
99. 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) 446 (1848).
100. *Id.* at 450.
101. *Id.* at 446.
102. *Id.* at 447.
103. *Id.*
C. Criminal Prosecutions of Enslaved People and of Slave Owners

Stowe first raised the conflict between humanity and law in *The Key to Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, in which she used Justice Thomas Ruffin’s opinion in *State v. Mann* as a central part of her discussion of the law of slavery.\(^{104}\) This conflict motivated her examination of Judge Clayton in *Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp*.\(^{105}\) The case arose from the prosecution of John Mann for assaulting Lydia, a slave whose services he had hired for one year.\(^{106}\) Mann hit Lydia when she committed a small offense, and she ran away.\(^{107}\) Mann “called upon her to stop”; when she did not, he shot her.\(^{108}\) A jury convicted him of battery, but Ruffin overturned the conviction.\(^{109}\)

Justice Ruffin captured the attention of abolitionists with his extraordinary opinion in *Mann* because he released the possessor of a slave from all legal control for harm to her despite his recognition of the inhumanity of his decision.\(^{110}\) Ruffin began by lamenting “[t]he struggle . . . in the Judge’s own breast between the feelings of the man, and the duty of the magistrate.”\(^{111}\) The opinion presents a mixture of rationales that together release Mann from liability for abusing a slave who was under his control.\(^{112}\) The issue, just as in Judge Clayton’s fictional case, was whether the hirer and possessor of a slave could be indicted for the abuse of her.

The opinion employed utilitarian and instrumentalist rationales, as well as ones based on community standards. Ruffin observed that no owner had ever been held liable for abuse of a slave.\(^{113}\) Ruffin had to follow the community’s rule of nonliability, for even if he thought differently, “we could not set our notions in array against the judgment of every body else, and say that this, or that authority, may be safely lopped off.”\(^{114}\) In cases involving slaves, “[t]he end is the profit of the master, his security and the public safety; the subject, one doomed in his own person, and his posterity,

\(^{104}\) *State v. Mann*, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829); STOWE, *supra* note 32, at 144–48.
\(^{105}\) STOWE, *supra* note 39, *passim*.
\(^{106}\) *Mann*, 13 N.C. at 263.
\(^{107}\) *Id*.
\(^{108}\) *Id*.
\(^{109}\) *Id.* at 263, 268.
\(^{110}\) *Id.* at 266 (“The power of the master must be absolute, to render the submission of the slave perfect. I most freely confess my sense of the harshness of this proposition, I feel it as deeply as any man can. And as a principle of moral right, every person in his retirement must repudiate it. But in the actual condition of things, it must be so.”).
\(^{111}\) *Id.* at 264.
\(^{112}\) *Id.* at 266–67 (“This discipline belongs to the state of slavery. They cannot be disunited, without abrogating at once the rights of the master, and absolving the slave from his subjection. It constitutes the curse of slavery to both the bond and free portions of our population.”).
\(^{113}\) *Id.* at 265.
\(^{114}\) *Id.*
to live without knowledge, and without the capacity to make any thing his own, and to toil that another may reap the fruits.”

Slaves, Ruffin acknowledged, would almost certainly perceive their situation as unjust. “What moral considerations,” Ruffin asked rhetorically, “shall be addressed to such a being, to convince him what, it is impossible but that the most stupid must feel and know can never be true”? Here Ruffin adopted a rule because he recognized that slaves would not accept their position in Southern society unless they were compelled to by force. Such obedience only arises when the master has “uncontrolled authority over the body.” Ruffin’s candid statement was extraordinary for its honesty and for its understanding that slaves would not abide by the Southerners’ moral philosophy, which taught that slaves should be content with their low place in Southern society.

Ruffin’s question also indicates that he recognized the artificial nature of slavery: however necessary it might have been to society, slavery needed the support of elaborate human institutions such as law. Even as Southerners increasingly defended slavery as a natural outgrowth of—and necessary to—human society, they also emphasized the need for humans to construct their intellectual and social environment. Ruffin’s position that he must construct a law to teach slaves their proper position in Southern society, which they would otherwise reject, appears as part of the dominant Southern philosophy that emphasized the control of nature through law. The centrality of the utilitarian and instrumentalist impulses appeared again in the conclusion of the opinion. Ruffin felt that as long as slavery existed, it was the “imperative duty of the Judges to recognise the full dominion of the owner over the slave” unless absolved of that duty by statute: “[T]his we do upon the ground, that this dominion is essential to the value of slaves as property, to the security of the master, and the public tranquility . . . .” In short, Ruffin considered the rule necessary because it “most effectually secur[ed] the general protection and comfort of the slaves themselves.”

Four years after State v. Mann, the North Carolina Supreme Court revisited the amount of control that owners (or their agents, such as

115. Id. at 266.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 267.
120. See, e.g., Holcombe, supra note 55, at 403–04 (linking the law with “complex and refined forms [of social existence] which have been developed by Christian civilization”).
121. Mann, 13 N.C. at 268.
122. Id.
123. Id.
overseers) could exercise over slaves in *State v. Negro Will.*

There, the court revealed a different conception of the docility that should be expected of slaves. *Will* raised the question of an overseer’s power over a slave through the prosecution of a slave who resisted, and ultimately mortally wounded, an overseer. The slave, Will, killed his overseer following a brief dispute with him. No one questioned that Will had argued with the overseer and that, in the process of running away, the overseer shot and wounded him. Will responded by cutting the overseer on the thigh and then the arm, which led to his death. The question was whether Will was guilty of murder or only a less serious charge of manslaughter, for the overseer had clearly been very aggressive in pursuing Will and had attacked him in a moment of irrational rage. Whether Will was guilty of first degree murder or only manslaughter turned on whether the law recognized that Will was legitimately (or understandably is probably a better word) resisting the overseer or whether—as some might suspect—the overseer could expect absolute and unqualified obedience from Will at all times, even in the midst of a dispute.

North Carolina Attorney General John R.J. Daniel, who argued the case for the state, turned to *State v. Mann* to show the slaves’ obligation of obedience. Daniel maintained that Will had no legal right to resist the overseer. Moreover, if the law recognized Will’s reaction to the attack by the overseer by reducing the severity of Will’s crime, such leniency, Daniel argued, “would beget desires for another, until nothing short of absolute emancipation would satisfy. It must then be had, or an alternative the most shocking to humanity would then be resorted to.” There was a large threat to changing the law and protecting slaves more (or, phrased differently, subjecting overseers to more court oversight). Daniel invoked a common argument about the ubiquity of slavery and the dangers of a failure to vigilantly control the enslaved population.

Two important values mixed in Justice William Gaston’s *Will* opinion. First was the desire to limit violence, particularly violence over slaves.

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124. 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 121 (1834).
125. *Id.* at 163–65.
126. *Id.* at 164–65.
127. *Id.* at 164.
128. *Id.*
129. *Id.* at 164–65.
130. *Id.* at 165–66.
131. *Id.* at 159–63.
132. *Id.* at 160–61.
133. *Id.* at 163.
134. *Id.* at 162–63.
135. *Id.* at 153–54.
136. *Id.* at 162–63.
While he recognized that “unconditional submission” was the “general duty of the slave,” Gaston thought that did not “authorise the master to kill his slave.”137 From that principle, he found some authority for Will’s fleeing from the overseer and found no authority for the overseer’s shooting of Will.138 Second was Gaston’s recognition of Will’s humanity and of the natural, human response he had to the attack by the overseer.139 Gaston concluded in rather remarkable terms that there were insufficient precedents to hold a slave guilty of homicide in all cases where he kills a person who has dominion over him.140 Will reveals Gaston’s concern with the subordination of everyone—master as well as slave—to the restraints of law. It also reveals his particular attention to human emotions.

Will also reveals more nuance within the judiciary over the question of a slave’s instinctive, human impulse for self-defense. As Jeannine DeLombard argued in In the Shadow of the Gallows, the slave who commits a crime is an important figure for establishing rational, responsible (because culpable) personhood and thus civic membership.141 This is different from the irrational, bestial figure of the savage (which, as Mitchell v. Wells142 reveals, reemerges late in the antebellum period in conjunction with the asylum movement), the controversy over the sixth census, and abolitionist efforts to place sole responsibility for slavery’s crimes on white slaveholders, leading to narratives of violent black incapacity.143

D. The Shifting Law of Emancipation by Travel in a Free State

A third set of cases that deal with the Southern judiciary’s images of enslaved people are suits where enslaved people claimed freedom based on travel in free states. There had been until the 1850s a fairly consistent constructional preference in border-state courts in favor of freedom when enslaved people traveled with their owners in free states.144 That constructional preference seems to have been based on a belief, stretching back to the late eighteenth century, that by voluntarily taking slaves to free states, their owners acquiesced in freedom.145

137. Id. at 121, 165.
138. Id. at 166–67.
139. Id. at 167.
140. Id. at 171–72 (quoting Psalm 19 (King James) and William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice act 3, sc. 1).
142. 37 Miss. 235, 259 (1859).
143. See DeLombard, supra note 141, at 216–22.
144. See Lea VanderVelde, Redemption Songs: Suing for Freedom Before Dred Scott 205–07 (2014) (discussing the phenomenon of freedom suits in St. Louis courts from 1820 to the Civil War, noting that they were decreasingly successful).
The most famous case to endorse proslavery thought and the shift away from a preference for freedom was the United States Supreme Court’s 1857 decision in *Dred Scott v. Sandford*.\(^{146}\) It dealt with the question of whether enslaved human beings became free if their owners took them into free jurisdictions.\(^{147}\) Once, that had been the law in Missouri.\(^{148}\) Thus, it came as something of a surprise when the Missouri Supreme Court ruled in 1852 that a slave, Dred Scott, who sued for his freedom with the claim that his owner had taken him into a free territory, was still a slave.\(^{149}\)

That set in motion an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, which gave the Court the opportunity to make formal constitutional law that had for many years only been the constitutional theorizing of Southern politicians like South Carolina Senator John C. Calhoun.\(^{150}\) Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s majority opinion in *Dred Scott* did at least two important things. First, it took away the right of citizenship, effectively silencing slaves in federal court, by ruling that slaves were not entitled to citizenship.\(^{151}\) Taney constitutionalized the ideas that had been circulating in proslavery thought for decades when he ruled that people of African descent were inferior and that they were not entitled to United States citizenship, which limited their ability to sue in federal court. Taney wrote that Africans had been seen for decades “as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”\(^{152}\) The result of such thinking was, according to Taney, “that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.”\(^{153}\) Justice John Campbell turned this doctrine into the broad statement that “[w]herever a master is entitled to go within the United States, his slave may accompany him.”\(^{154}\) The reality of rights of free people was different, as today’s scholars are beginning to show, especially

\(^{146}\) 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

\(^{147}\) *Id.* at 431–32.

\(^{148}\) *Id.* at 406.

\(^{149}\) *Id.* at 407.

\(^{150}\) *Id.* at 516 (Campbell, J., concurring).
in border regions like Maryland, but the Supreme Court was trying to announce a new legal reality that shored up the Southern rhetoric about African-American inferiority.

Second, Taney’s opinion also addressed the power of Congress to legislate for the territories. One part of the Missouri Compromise in 1820 prohibited slavery in the United States’ territories north of Missouri’s southern border. If slavery was indeed illegal there, then presumably the Scott family’s time in the territory of Upper Louisiana (what is now Minnesota) would make it free. But here Taney drew upon the idea, popularized by Senator John C. Calhoun beginning in the 1830s, that the Constitution protected slavery and that Congress could do nothing that discriminated against slavery. Thus, Congress could not exclude slavery from the territories. In Taney’s phrasing, the United States had “the duty of promoting the interests of the whole people of the Union.” Congress could not discriminate against slavery as a form of property, because “no word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property” than any other kind of property. Thus, Congress could not prohibit slavery in the territories, which took away the argument that Dred Scott had resided in a free territory. In fact, slavery had been legal in all the United States’ territories despite the Missouri Compromise.

Both of Taney’s key points—that people of African descent could not be citizens and that Congress could not take action


156. Taney’s opinion fits, too, with Roth’s thesis about how proslavery Southerners responded to the new abolitionist emphasis on slave humanity, such as the print titled “Am I Not a Man and a Brother?” See ROTH, supra note 3, at 117 fig.4.2. His opinion tried to equate lack of citizenship with lack of personhood and thus further instill a legal “reality” to match the rhetoric about African-American inferiority. Jeannine Marie DeLombard, Human Kinds: Slave, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO LAW AND HUMANITIES IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (Nan Goodman & Simon Stern eds., forthcoming 2016). Similarly, some cases, especially in the 1850s, denied slaves the right to choose freedom or slavery when their owners’ wills provided that slaves would go free if they left the state. See, e.g., Bailey v. Poindexter, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 132, 197 (1858). Where once courts allowed slaves to choose slavery or freedom, in keeping with their owners’ wills, decisions like Bailey took away that right. This parallels Dred Scott’s attempt to make notions of white supremacy and black nonpersonhood a legal reality.


159. See id. at 139.

160. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 451–52; FEHRENBACKER, supra note 158, at 46–47, 122–23, 134–39 (discussing Calhoun’s ideas regarding the federal government as the “common agent” of sovereign and equal states, and the implication of those ideas for the protection of slavery).

161. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 448.

162. Id. at 452.

163. See id.

164. Id.
against property in slavery—were key elements of Southern constitutional thinking. Slaves were incapable of exercising political rights and so should not have them. And the denial of citizenship silenced enslaved people. It wrote the Southern belief that enslaved people were inferior and did not deserve rights into law. Moreover, this denial also wrote into formal constitutional law the Southern belief that the Constitution recognized slavery and that the federal government could not act against it. These were the constitutional principles that went along with the understanding of history and moral philosophy that Southerners had been building for decades. The opinion incorporated the substance of Southern thinking about slavery and federalism. The process by which those ideas were made popular and introduced to the state courts and then brought to the Supreme Court is an important one that has been told by many different people.165

IV. The Proslavery Response to African-American Citizenship

Proslavery Southerners employed empiricism and historical arguments to make the case that slavery was a common condition and that enslaved people in the Americas, particularly the United States, were incapable of freedom. In the courts, this position reached its high-water mark in 1857 in *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, where the United States Supreme Court decided that enslaved people were not citizens for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.166 This rested on the historically suspect argument that enslaved people in the United States had never been entitled to citizenship.167 *Dred Scott* reflects the Southern idea that slaves must be denied citizenship; it was an attempt to make a legal reality out of a response to the increasingly powerful abolitionist argument that humanized enslaved people. While the abolitionists—black and white—were turning voters’ minds to the belief that people of African descent should be citizens, the Southern proslavery response was that they had not been and they were not fit for citizenship. This was a key point of clash.

*Dred Scott* legitimized the belief that enslaved people were not citizens and had no citizenship rights. Indeed, *Dred Scott* should be read as an attempt to take away citizenship rights at precisely the moment that antislavery writers were advancing the citizenship rights of enslaved people. Under this reading, Taney’s opinion becomes part of a dialogue that included—and perhaps was started—by antislavery women writers. Other


166. *Dred Scott*, 60 U.S. at 427.

167. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 157, at 1761 (arguing that free African-Americans in Maryland were often considered citizens).
opinions picked up this theme and extended it between the decision of *Dred Scott* in March 1857 and the beginning of Civil War in 1861. Dred Scott was cited numerous times before the Civil War, from treatises like Thomas Cobb’s *Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery* and George Sawyer’s *Southern Institutes* to cases like the Mississippi High Court of Errors and Appeals opinion in *Mitchell v. Wells* to justify the deprivation of rights to enslaved people and to shore up support for the idea that slavery was constitutionally protected. In taking away citizenship from African-Americans, *Dred Scott* and *Mitchell* responded to the abolitionist rhetoric on African-American citizenship. Such responses were designed to make a legal reality out of their belief of the inferiority of people of African ancestry. The courts were responding to popular culture and to the abolitionist efforts to make slaves into citizens.

In *Mitchell v. Wells*, the Mississippi High Court of Errors and Appeals faced a question about whether a Mississippi resident who took a slave to Ohio and freed her could leave her property in his will. The Mississippi courts and legislature had for decades struggled to reach an understanding of just how restrictive the state should be when owners tried to free their slaves. But attitudes were changing in the proslavery direction in Mississippi, and they came to a focal point in *Mitchell v. Wells*.

In October 1846, Edward Wells took a slave, Nancy (who also happened to be his daughter), to Ohio and liberated her according to state law. Nancy Wells stayed for nearly two years in Ohio before returning to Mississippi in 1848, shortly before her father died. She stayed in Mississippi for a few more years, but in 1851 moved back to Ohio and subsequently sought the money left to her in her father’s will. Edward Wells’s executor refused to recognize Nancy as a free person. This set up the question of whether a person who was once a slave in Mississippi could ever inherit property from a Mississippi resident. There was no

171. See, e.g., *Hinds v. Brazealle*, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) 837, 841–44 (1838) (denying emancipation and inheritance to the child of a testator because the child’s mother was the testator’s slave).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 237–38.
174. Id. at 238.
175. Id. at 238–39.
question of putting Nancy Wells back in slavery, for at the time of the
lawsuit she lived in Ohio; the only question was whether she could inherit
from her father’s estate.\textsuperscript{178}

Mitchell’s question of whether a former slave who no longer lived in
Mississippi could inherit property in Mississippi might seem like an
inconsequential matter. Few people would be taken outside the state and
freed, and even fewer would be devised property by the will of a
Mississippi resident.\textsuperscript{179} However, for Justice William L. Harris this became
a vehicle for a lengthy opinion that brought together policy arguments about
“the security of our institutions and the safety of the people.”\textsuperscript{180} Harris saw
the case as promoting emancipation and as potentially recognizing the Ohio
emancipation, which he considered inconsistent with Mississippi law.\textsuperscript{181}
Harris framed the case as a test of comity, the respect that one state (or
nation) gives to the laws (or judicial decisions) of another.\textsuperscript{182} This became
a conflict between Ohio’s act of emancipation and Mississippi law. The
issue was whether Mississippi should recognize Ohio’s act and allow one of
its former slaves to receive property.\textsuperscript{183} Harris believed Nancy Wells
should not inherit.\textsuperscript{184}

Harris constructed the Mitchell opinion around the idea that
Mississippi would not allow slaves to be taken outside the state and freed.\textsuperscript{185}
Once a slave in Mississippi, always a slave. Harris’s lengthy and zealously
proslavery opinion is remarkable for the breadth of proslavery judicial
arguments just before secession. It is also revealing for how much Thomas
Cobb’s An Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery, which was published the
year before Mitchell v. Wells, helped promote proslavery arguments.\textsuperscript{186}
Harris seems to have drawn upon Cobb in many ways. For instance, Harris
asked rhetorically how courts might determine what is in the public’s
interest:

\begin{quote}
[A]re we to be guided by the nature and character of our institutions;
our Constitution and form of government; their nature, character, and
whole history; the manners, customs, and habits of our people; our
climate, soil, and productions; the resolutions and public acts of her
\end{quote}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{178} Id.
\textsuperscript{179} See Charles S. Sydnor, The Free Negro in Mississippi Before the Civil War, 32 AM.
HIST. REV. 769, 772–79 (1927).
\textsuperscript{180} Mitchell, 37 Miss. at 238.
\textsuperscript{181} Id. at 238–39.
\textsuperscript{182} Id. at 262–64.
\textsuperscript{183} Id. at 263–64.
\textsuperscript{184} Id. at 264.
\textsuperscript{185} Id. at 263.
\textsuperscript{186} See COBB, supra note 52.
\end{flushleft}
conventions and general assemblies, as sources of evidence indicating public policy?187

The answer, as with Cobb, was that history, manners, customs, and habits were all important. They both pointed toward slavery and against recognizing Ohio’s actions.188

Harris reasoned based on his reading of history and of Mississippi’s constitutional history and statutes that the policy of the state was to restrict emancipation of slaves.189 He looked back to the framing of the federal constitution to support his belief that the African race was in an inferior, subordinate, subjugated condition.... They were so regarded then by all the States united, and because thus incapable of freedom or of self-government, and unfit by their nature and constitution to become citizens and equal associates with the white race in this family of States, they were rejected, and treated and acknowledged in the Constitution as slaves.190

Mississippi came into the United States on the principle of white supremacy. It was “to be associated on terms of political equality, comity, or courtesy with the white race, who alone by that compact had a right to be thus associated.”191 Mississippi came into the Union with this institution, not only sanctioned, provided for, and protected by her own Constitution, by the direct act and recognition of the other States of the Union, and by the express provisions of that same Constitution which had originally excluded the African race from the privileges of citizenship, but with a right to full protection, under that instrument, both for the enjoyment of her property in slaves, and against the degradation of political companionship, association, and equality with them in the future.192

Slavery was a matter of economics and society. It was, indeed, the foundation of the state. For Mississippi’s “climate, soil, and productions, and the pursuits of her people, their habits, manners, and opinions, all... require slave labor.”193 Many legislators in Mississippi in the 1830s were concerned with prohibiting the importation of slaves into the state because they feared (so Harris wrote) that border states would sell their

188. *Id.* at 251–52; COBB, *supra* note 52, at ccvix–ccxxi.
190. *Id.*
191. *Id.* (emphasis omitted).
192. *Id.* (emphasis omitted).
193. *Id.*
slaves to Mississippi and then, once they had lowered their slave population, would also turn against slavery.\footnote{194. Id. at 253–54. See also An Act in Relation to Slaves, Free Negroes and Mulattoes, REVISED CODE OF THE STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI 234 (Jackson, E. Barksdale 1857).}

In addition to the federal Constitution, the Mississippi Constitution, and statutes that together established the policy in favor of slavery in Mississippi, Harris turned to Thomas Cobb’s \textit{An Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery} for the argument that slavery was consistent with natural law, so that wherever the slave went a law of slavery went with him.\footnote{195. Mitchell, 37 Miss. at 258–61.} Despite some suggestions that slavery ended when a slave traveled to a jurisdiction where there was no positive law of slavery, because of the comity owed towards the slave’s home state, slavery continued.\footnote{196. For Cobb’s treatment of the comity theory in the context of slaves traveling to slavery-free jurisdictions, see COBB, supra note 52, at 198–229, especially 215.} That is, while a slave visited a place where there was no law of slavery, the municipal law of the slave’s home continued in force in the new state.\footnote{197. Mitchell, 37 Miss. at 260–61 (citing COBB, supra note 52).} This was one of Cobb’s most creative and controversial arguments.\footnote{198. It was both creative and controversial because it suggested that wherever a slave went a positive law of slavery went with her, like a penumbra of slavery. \textit{Compare id.} (adopting Cobb’s view that a slave’s status in Mississippi remains unchanged in a free state and the slave’s home-state law must still be followed), \textit{with Stephenson v. Harrison}, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 728, 732–33 (1859) (rejecting Cobb’s view that as long as slaves are property they have no standing in any court).}

Harris also cited Cobb’s \textit{Inquiry} to show that comity did not require Mississippi to give effect to an attempted emancipation in Ohio.\footnote{199. Mitchell, 37 Miss. at 262.} For comity required mutual respect and mutual interest, and there was little of either between Mississippi and Ohio at that point:

The State of Ohio, forgetful of her constitutional obligations to the whole race, and afflicted with a \textit{negro-mania}, which inclines her to \textit{descend}, rather than elevate herself in the scale of humanity, chooses to take to her embrace, as citizens, the neglected race, who by common consent of the States united, were regarded, at the formation of our government, as an inferior caste, incapable of the blessings of free government, and occupying, in the order of nature, an intermediate state between the irrational animal and the white man.\footnote{200. Id. at 262–63.}

In Harris’s mind, it was not that Mississippi failed to grant comity to Ohio’s emancipation action, but that Ohio was trying to undermine
Mississippi, for Ohio’s actions threatened the stability of slavery in Mississippi. \(^{201}\)

The most outlandish part of the opinion was a query at the end regarding whether Mississippi would be expected to grant comity to Ohio if it granted citizenship rights to orangutans. \(^{202}\)

[A]re we to be told that “comity” will require of the States not thus demented, to forget their own policy and self-respect, and lower their own citizens and institutions in the scale of being, to meet the necessities of the mongrel race thus attempted to be introduced into the family of sisters in this confederacy? \(^{203}\)

Harris revealed a robust defense of slavery in Mississippi and a disdain for the ideas of freedom in Ohio. Certainly Harris had those views independent of Cobb’s *An Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery*, but Cobb helped give shape and legitimacy to the resistance to Ohio’s emancipation. The ideas developed by Southern academics worked in conjunction with those of Southern politicians and jurists. Harris’ *Mitchell v. Wells* opinion reflects the anger and the entitlement felt by Southern jurists and the slave-owning class. His opinion illustrates well the centrality of constitutional rights to slavery and property and the ideas of white supremacy that helped steer the South towards secession.

V. Who Were the Agents of Reform? Causation in *Gender and Race in Antebellum Popular Culture*

So far I have suggested how the framework that Roth develops of images of enslaved people in popular culture correlates with and helps us understand the reaction of the Southern judiciary. Southern judges reacted to the image of the enslaved person as a threat by allowing owners substantial control over them. \(^{204}\) Then, as the popular image shifted and began to recognize the humanity of enslaved men, judges again shifted their approach to deny them citizenship and to make emancipation more difficult. \(^{205}\) As Southerners shifted from a sense that there should be a gradual termination of slavery to an expansion of it, the judiciary followed suit. The judiciary likely contributed to that evolution in addition to drawing from it.

And therein lies a complex question that must be asked of Roth’s framework. There is no doubt that antebellum popular culture and judicial

\(^{201}\) *Id.* at 263.

\(^{202}\) *Id.* at 264.

\(^{203}\) *Id.* Perhaps Justice Harris took the example of an orangutan from Cobb’s discussion of similarities between Africans and monkeys. *See* COBB, supra note 52, at 25.

\(^{204}\) *See* State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263, 2 Dev. 167 (1829).

\(^{205}\) *See generally* Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
culture overlapped; indeed, the depictions of African-Americans by
Northern and Southern writers and Southern jurists are highly correlated.
But how much of what she writes about provided an impulse to change?
Did the popular culture that she so thoroughly reconstructs just correlate
with the antislavery triumph on public ideas about African-American
citizenship and the South’s move towards war? Or did it actually help
change the attitudes and ideas of American voters in the Civil War era?
Such ideas about preparation for citizenship continued to have salience for
generations and continued to be used to justify the deprivation of African-
American voting rights—as Atticus Finch’s character in Go Set a
Watchman reveals. Set in the 1950s, Finch denies that African-Americans
are ready for citizenship.206 “What would happen if all the Negroes in the
South were suddenly given full civil rights?,” Atticus asks his daughter Jean
Louise. “I’ll tell you. There’d be another Reconstruction. Would you want
your state governments run by people who don’t know how to run ’em?”207
It is easy to see how images of citizenship matter and how the people Roth
writes about should be viewed as heroes.

Such questions of causation are important and controversial at the
same time. A central question of Gender and Race in Antebellum Popular
Culture is: To what extent did the antislavery writers create a new culture
that led to the emancipation of enslaved people? That is, how much did the
antislavery culture bearers prepare the way for emancipation?208 There is a
parallel question for the South: to what extent did proslavery writers and
jurists prepare the way for secession? A key question about Roth’s thesis is
how much the independent variable of antislavery fictional literature
produced by white women contributed to the multiple-regression equation
that explains the huge change in our nation’s attitudes towards enslaved
people (and men in particular).

I have two questions about the paths of causation. First, how much did
the Northern critique lead to a Southern reaction? Second, how much did
Northern antislavery women clear the path for African-American
citizenship? As to the first question, the divergence between the judiciary
and popular culture at certain points raises an additional question about
causation. Where, for instance, the Southern sentimental literature depicted
slaves as part of a plantation family, Southern legal opinions left slaves
subject to the violent whims of their owners and even denied literal family
members the right to inherit from their fathers.

207. Id.
208. For an example of the numerous other works that highlight antislavery fiction’s criticism
of proslavery law and raise a similar question about its causative effect, see generally JEANNINE
MARIE DELOMBARD, SLAVERY ON TRIAL: LAW, ABOLITIONISM, AND PRINT CULTURE (2007).
By looking at the Southern judiciary and its points of divergence from popular culture, it is possible to make some preliminary estimates of the relative importance of judicial culture, with its emphasis on economic analysis and historical and demographic data, to Southern proslavery thought. Focusing on Southern legal thought and its appearance in the discussion of secession reveals that the images Roth finds in Southern popular culture were extremely salient in Southern politics and law. It also reveals that the secession movement departed in some significant ways from the paternalistic myth of the plantation South; hard-nosed Southern politicians and jurists turned to economic analysis as they moved toward secession. The speeches supporting secession by leading jurists like Thomas R.R. Cobb, William L. Harris, and William L. Benning, as well as leading academics like James Holcombe, had a similar economic focus. As the North was turning toward images of African-Americans as citizens and embracing the image of a broader democracy, Southerners were moving in a very different direction, towards a republic based on white supremacy. As each side moved in different directions, the Civil War was an understandable result.

I also want to suggest that there were other impulses to the evolution of support for African-American citizenship than the white, female abolitionists at the center of this story, and that there were other opponents than the Southern writers who opposed them. While I believe that Roth has done very important work in introducing women actors into the legal debate and that those terms of debate traversed empiricism, historicism, questions about obedience to law, and the role of citizenship in constitutional culture, we should not forget that they were joined in important ways by African-American writers and actors. And even beyond the formulators of popular culture, there were important economic and political motives to the

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211. Henry L. Benning, Secessionist Speech (Nov. 19, 1860), reprinted in SECESSION DEBATED, supra note 209, at 115–44.

212. 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1861, at 75 (George H. Reese ed., 1965).

213. See generally ERICA ARMSTRONG DUNBAR, A FRAGILE FREEDOM: AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN AND EMANCIPATION IN THE ANTEBELLUM CITY (2008); LESLIE M. HARRIS, IN THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN NEW YORK CITY, 1626–1863 (2003); BENJAMIN QUARLES, BLACK ABOLITIONISTS (1969). African-American people were more than an image; they were living people. White abolitionists like William Lloyd Garrison and Roth’s subjects were in conversation with black people and moved toward immediatism because of African-Americans’ demands for the same.
rising opposition to slavery. The multiple-regression equation that explains changes in law and in legal theory has many variables.

Roth establishes a framework for the shifting ideas about slavery and antislavery from the 1820s through the Civil War that helps legal historians understand three things. First, Southern judges and lawyers were shifting their rhetoric (and in some minor ways, doctrine) in conjunction with changing images of enslaved people; second, many responded to the Southern legal thought, and Southern legal thinkers responded to the abolitionist critique of them; and third, Southern legal thought had a strong correlation with secession rhetoric. All three points contribute to a sophisticated picture of the multiple connections between legal thought, public thought, and fundamental issues of citizenship and slavery.

What is clear is that the arguments central to post-Civil War legal thought—historicism and empiricism, and, for some, a skepticism of rules based on long-term practices—all found expression in a deep and sophisticated jurisprudence before the Civil War. Often that work was written by antislavery women. We are still going to need to debate how and whether those ideas impelled our nation towards the Civil War and then freedom. Clearly, Roth has opened important speculation on what caused legal and constitutional ideas to shift. She has opened up new intellectual terrain and populated it with people who we did not previously realize had engaged in debate on legal and constitutional issues. Roth’s book marks the emergence of a sophisticated model of how cultural and legal concepts interacted as our country moved towards the Civil War and, ultimately, freedom.