

Articles

The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine

David Gray,^{*} Meagan Cooper^{**} & David McAloon^{***}

In a line of cases beginning with United States v. Calandra, the Court has created a series of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule that permit illegally seized evidence to be admitted in litigation forums collateral to criminal trials. This “collateral use” exception allows the government to profit from Fourth Amendment violations in grand jury investigations, civil tax suits, habeas proceedings, immigration removal procedures, and parole revocation hearings. In this Article we argue that these collateral use exceptions raise serious conceptual and practical concerns. The core of our critique is that the collateral use exception reconstitutes a version of the “silver platter doctrine.” In the days before the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule were incorporated to the states, the silver platter doctrine allowed federal courts to admit evidence seized by state law enforcement agents during “unreasonable” searches and seizures. The silver platter doctrine was rejected by the Court in 1960 out of concern that it was compromising states’ efforts to guarantee constitutional protections because it created incentives for state law enforcement officers to violate the Fourth Amendment. By reconstituting the silver platter doctrine, the Court’s collateral use cases have recreated some of those incentives. Our research indicates that these incentives have been successful in altering police practices in ways that threaten the Fourth Amendment rights of all citizens.

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* Associate Professor, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.

** University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.

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I. Introduction

At its inception in 1886,¹ and through its incorporation to the states in 1961,² the Supreme Court regarded the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule as a remedy required by constitutional principle.³ It was designed to nullify violations,⁴ to prevent the government from benefitting by its wrongdoing,⁵ and to preserve the moral integrity of the courts and the government as constitutional torchbearers.⁶ On this view, the exclusionary rule was bound to the Fourth Amendment itself. The remedy defined the right;⁷ or, as Justice Holmes put the point in *Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States*,⁸ “[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way

1. *Boyd v. United States*, 116 U.S. 616, 634–35 (1886).

2. *Mapp v. Ohio*, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).

3. *See, e.g.*, *Agnello v. United States*, 269 U.S. 20, 35 (1925) (“The admission of evidence obtained by [an illegal] search and seizure was error and prejudicial to the substantial rights of [the defendant].”); *Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States*, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (holding that allowing the government to profit from illegally seized evidence “reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words”); *Weeks v. United States*, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (“If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.”); *see also* Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, “A More Majestic Conception”: *The Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule*, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 50–53 (2010) (summarizing the Court’s attitude toward the exclusionary rule between its inception and its incorporation to the states); William C. Heffernan, *The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Remedy*, 88 GEO. L.J. 799, 808 (2000) (discussing the inception of the exclusionary rule and cases that applied it); Potter Stewart, *The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases*, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1372–77 (1983) (tracing the development of the exclusionary rule from *Boyd v. United States* to *Mapp v. Ohio*).

4. *Weeks*, 232 U.S. at 393.

5. *Id.*

6. *Id.* at 394.

7. *Cf. Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (“[E]very right, when withheld, must have a remedy . . .”).

8. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).

is that . . . it shall not be used at all.”⁹ The alternative, he wrote, “reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words.”¹⁰

The contemporary Court has abandoned all of the principled justifications of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and the conceptual link between that remedy and Fourth Amendment rights. It has instead adopted what William Heffernan calls the “severance principle,” which holds that the exclusionary rule is a punitive sanction, not a personal remedy, and that it is justified solely by its ability to deter government agents from violating the Fourth Amendment and not by its potential to vindicate harms suffered by citizens whose rights are violated.¹¹ The severance principle was on prominent display in *Davis v. United States*.¹² In that case the Court held that Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when his car was searched secondary to his lawful arrest and the officers could claim neither emergency nor independent probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime would be found in the car.¹³ The Court nevertheless held that Davis could not avail himself of the exclusionary rule because the officers who effected that search relied to their detriment on federal law established in their circuit, which, following *New York v. Belton*,¹⁴ permitted police to perform automobile searches as a matter of right incident to a lawful arrest of the driver.¹⁵ That rule was revoked by the Court in *Arizona v. Gant*,¹⁶ but only after the search of Davis’s car.¹⁷ Given this course of events, the Court reasoned that inflicting the exclusionary rule would serve no purpose because it could not have deterred the officers who searched Davis’s car or any similarly situated officer who abides the established federal law of her circuit.¹⁸

As one of us argues at length elsewhere, the Court’s logic in *Davis*, and other cases where it has developed and applied this “good faith” exception, is deeply flawed and threatens to degrade substantive Fourth Amendment rights.¹⁹ Jennifer Laurin has reached a similar conclusion on different

9. *Id.* at 392.

10. *Id.*; see also *Weeks*, 232 U.S. at 393 (“If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.”).

11. Heffernan, *supra* note 3, at 825.

12. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).

13. *Id.* at 2431.

14. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).

15. *Davis*, 131 S. Ct. at 2428.

16. 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009).

17. *Arizona v. Gant* was decided on April 21, 2009. *Id.* at 332. Davis’s car was searched in April 2007. *Davis*, 131 S. Ct. at 2425.

18. *Davis*, 131 S. Ct. at 2428–29.

19. See David Gray, *A Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence*, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013)

grounds by critically engaging the Court's decisions limiting the access of citizens to civil remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.²⁰ In this Article, we advance this critique by engaging in a close analysis of another far-reaching exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule that has grown out of the severance principle: the "collateral use" exception.

In a line of cases beginning with *United States v. Calandra*,²¹ the Court has created a series of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule that allow illegally seized evidence to be admitted in litigation forums collateral to criminal trials. This collateral use exception permits the government to profit from Fourth Amendment violations in grand jury investigations,²² civil tax suits,²³ habeas proceedings,²⁴ immigration removal procedures,²⁵ and parole revocation hearings.²⁶ In this Article, we argue that the collateral use exception raises serious conceptual and practical concerns. The core of our critique is the fact that the collateral use exception reconstitutes a version of what was once known as the "silver platter doctrine," which allowed evidence seized illegally by state and local police to be admitted in federal court as long as the local officials were not acting as agents of federal law enforcement.²⁷ The silver platter doctrine was rejected by the Court in *Elkins v. United States*²⁸ out of concern that it was compromising states' efforts to guarantee constitutional protections for their citizens by creating incentives for state and local police officers to violate the Fourth Amendment.²⁹ By rehabilitating the silver platter doctrine, the Court's collateral use cases have recreated these incentives, encouraging law enforcement officers at all levels to engage in illegal searches and seizures. These are not abstract concerns. Our research indicates that these incentives are altering police practices in ways that threaten the Fourth Amendment rights of all citizens, and particularly those whose economic circumstances or ethnic and racial identities make them all too frequent targets for abuse.³⁰ We begin with a brief history of the silver platter doctrine.

(manuscript at 56) (on file with authors) (arguing that "deterrence considerations alone are not sufficient to justify a general good faith exception to the exclusionary rule").

20. See Jennifer E. Laurin, *Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence*, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 740 (2011) (arguing that the convergence of the good faith exception with immunity doctrine will result in a functional diminishment of Fourth Amendment protection).

21. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).

22. *Id.* at 354–55.

23. *United States v. Janis*, 428 U.S. 433, 459–60 (1976).

24. *Stone v. Powell*, 428 U.S. 465, 494–96 (1976).

25. *INS v. Lopez-Mendoza*, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1984).

26. *Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott*, 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998).

27. We elaborate the contours and consequences of the silver platter doctrine *infra* in Part II.

28. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).

29. *Id.* at 222.

30. For example, according to the 2010 Census, about 14% of the population identified themselves as "black" and about 75% identified as "white." BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, C2010BR-06, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2010, at 3 tbl.1 (2011) [hereinafter BLACK

II. The Birth of the Silver Platter Doctrine

Weeks v. United States,³¹ decided in 1914, established the exclusionary rule as the primary mechanism to enforce Fourth Amendment rights against federal officers in federal court proceedings. There the Court committed to the exclusionary rule as a matter of constitutional principle.³² Specifically, the Court held that the constitutional imperative that government officials not engage in “unreasonable” searches and seizures would be violated, and the Fourth Amendment effectively nullified, if those who are “entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws”³³ could be “aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.”³⁴ In addition to its concerns with fundamental principle, the Court in *Weeks* also worried about the integrity of the federal judiciary and the government more generally, which would be compromised if federal prosecutors were allowed to exploit Fourth Amendment violations perpetrated by their investigative colleagues at trial.³⁵

Although the Court in *Weeks* held that exclusion was the only remedy for Fourth Amendment violations sufficient to maintain the integrity of the Constitution and the courts, it did not impose either the Fourth Amendment or the exclusionary rule on state courts.³⁶ The Fourth Amendment was not incorporated to the states until *Wolf v. Colorado*³⁷ in 1949, and the exclusionary rule was not incorporated until *Mapp v. Ohio*³⁸ in 1961. The intervening years gave rise to a practice known as the silver platter doctrine, which allowed federal courts to admit evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment by state law enforcement agents if those state officials neither acted at the direction nor with the foreknowledge of federal agents.³⁹ *Byars v. United States*⁴⁰ shows the doctrine's basic operation.

POPULATION]; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, C2010BR-05, THE WHITE POPULATION: 2010, at 3 tbl.1 (2011) [hereinafter WHITE POPULATION]. However, a disproportionate 39% of the parole population in 2010 was black, while only 42% was white. LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 236019, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 43 app. tbl.15 (2011) [hereinafter PROBATION AND PAROLE 2010]. Almost by definition, then, the collateral use exception for parole revocation hearings will impact black citizens disproportionately. As we point out below, these raw numbers only begin to tell the full story.

31. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

32. *Id.* at 392.

33. *Id.*

34. *Id.* at 393.

35. *Id.* at 394.

36. *Id.* at 398.

37. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).

38. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

39. *Elkins v. United States*, 364 U.S. 206, 213–15 (1960).

40. 273 U.S. 28 (1927).

Byars involved an investigation by state law enforcement into the manufacture of intoxicating liquors. Despite their failure to show that there was probable cause to believe that the “fruits and instrumentalities”⁴¹ of a crime would be found on the premises, local law enforcement officers secured a warrant from a local magistrate granting them authority to search Byars’s home for “intoxicating liquors and instruments and materials used in the manufacture of such liquors.”⁴² On their way to conduct the search, the local officers recruited a federal revenue agent named Adams to assist them.⁴³ Adams participated in the search, which resulted in the discovery of “strip stamps” used to prove the provenance and tax status of whiskey.⁴⁴ Adams took custody of the stamps, which were later introduced at trial when Byars was prosecuted for violating federal liquor laws.⁴⁵ There was no dispute that the stamps were the product of an illegal search.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, the Court pointed out that the United States Attorney was at liberty under the silver platter doctrine “to avail [himself] of evidence improperly seized by state officers operating entirely upon their own account.”⁴⁷ Unfortunately for the government, the state agents did not act entirely on their own account when conducting the search of Byars’s home. Rather, the Court found that Adams was a principal in the “wrongful search and seizure,” which barred application of the silver platter doctrine.⁴⁸ Therefore, while affirming the silver platter doctrine itself, the Court held that the facts in *Byars* fell outside its scope because the illegal search was conducted in part by a federal official.

The Court’s recognition of the silver platter doctrine during the first half of the twentieth century is easy to understand. After all, the Fourth Amendment had not been incorporated to the states and, therefore, it was literally impossible for a state agent to violate the Fourth Amendment, no matter how unreasonable his conduct. Absent a violation, the principled concerns that animated the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in *Weeks* and *Silverthorne* simply did not arise. What is surprising is that nothing much changed in 1949 when the Court incorporated the Fourth Amendment to the states in *Wolf v. Colorado*.⁴⁹ Despite limiting state agents to the compass of the Fourth Amendment in *Wolf*, the Court declined to incorporate

41. Before 1967, the Court took the position that warrants should not issue if the proposed search was for “mere evidence” rather than the “fruits and instrumentalities” of a crime. The Court abandoned that view in *Warden v. Hayden*, 387 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1967).

42. *Byars*, 273 U.S. at 29.

43. *Id.* at 30.

44. *Id.* at 29.

45. *Id.* at 31–32.

46. *Id.* at 33.

47. *Id.* at 33.

48. *Id.*

49. 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949); see *Elkins v. United States*, 364 U.S. 206, 213–14 (1960) (noting that federal courts continued to admit evidence illegally seized by state officers even though the logical foundation of the *Weeks* admissibility rule had been undermined by *Wolf v. Colorado*).

the exclusionary rule.⁵⁰ To the contrary, on the same day the Court issued its opinion in *Weeks*, it confirmed the continued survival of the silver platter doctrine in *Lustig v. United States*.⁵¹ As a consequence, the Court instead left it to each of the various states to develop its own enforcement regime. Over the next decade or so about half of the states adopted the exclusionary rule.⁵² Those decisions had no bearing on what happened in federal court, however. As a consequence, in states where the exclusionary rule was adopted as a matter of state law, officers who faced exclusion in state court could simply hand illegally seized evidence off to their federal colleagues, who could use it at will in federal court under the silver platter doctrine.⁵³

III. The Demise of the Silver Platter Doctrine

The silver platter doctrine survived for more than a decade after *Wolf* until *Elkins v. United States*.⁵⁴ Writing for the Court in *Elkins*, Justice Stewart first pointed out that, in the wake of *Wolf*, the silver platter doctrine constituted a bit of a contradiction in that it suggested that there was a substantive difference between the Fourth Amendment as enforced directly on federal agents and as enforced indirectly through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.⁵⁵ In addition to this problem of “logical symmetry,”⁵⁶ Justice Stewart also took account of the damage that the silver platter doctrine was doing to efforts by state courts to secure the protections of the Fourth Amendment for their citizens during their engagements with state law enforcement officers.⁵⁷ The Court in *Elkins* was particularly persuaded by the experience of states like California that had first rejected and then accepted the exclusionary rule in the years after *Wolf*.⁵⁸

Like many of its sister states, California took advantage of the discretion afforded to it before *Elkins* to experiment with different ways to secure Fourth Amendment protections for its citizens. The Supreme Court of California, led by the legendary jurist Roger J. Traynor, was initially quite skeptical of the exclusionary rule and declined to follow the Supreme Court's

50. *Wolf*, 338 U.S. at 33; see also *United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co.*, 336 U.S. 793, 798 (1949) (indicating in dicta that the exclusionary rule is an “extraordinary sanction devised by this Court to prevent violations of the Fourth Amendment”).

51. 338 U.S. 74, 78–79 (1949) (“The crux of that doctrine is that a search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter.”).

52. *Elkins*, 364 U.S. at 219.

53. See *id.* at 210–11 (describing the use in federal prosecutions of evidence obtained through unconstitutional searches by state officials).

54. *Id.* at 223–24.

55. *Id.* at 215.

56. *Id.* at 216.

57. *Id.* at 220–21.

58. *Id.*

example, even after *Wolf*.⁵⁹ That court instead left enforcement of the Fourth Amendment to administrative, criminal, and civil remedies.⁶⁰ The views of Justice Traynor and his brethren changed dramatically in subsequent years as they assessed the results of their experiment. By 1955 it was clear to them that local and state agents in California were routinely violating the Fourth Amendment and that “[e]xperience ha[d] demonstrated” that “neither administrative, criminal nor civil remedies [we]re effective in suppressing lawless searches and seizures.”⁶¹ Writing for his court in *People v. Cahan*,⁶² Justice Traynor therefore reversed course and held that, henceforth, evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment would not be admissible in trials conducted in California courts, no matter who paid the salaries of the offending officers.⁶³

The effect of the exclusionary rule on California law enforcement agents was immediate and dramatic. Less than two years after *Cahan*, California’s highest ranking law enforcement officer reported that adopting the exclusionary rule had improved the professionalism of state law enforcement officers and had brought about a much closer working relationship between police officers and prosecutors.⁶⁴ In the face of these successes, the *Elkins* Court expressed concern that the silver platter doctrine not only interposed a logical contradiction in substantive Fourth Amendment law, but also “frustrate[d] [state] policy [designed to secure Fourth Amendment rights] in a particularly inappropriate and ironic way” by providing a collateral forum for the admission of evidence seized illegally by state agents.⁶⁵ The Court’s straightforward concern was that the existence of the silver platter doctrine preserved significant incentives for state law enforcement agents to violate the Fourth Amendment. These officers knew, after all, that even if the evidence could not be used at a state trial, it could still be used to prosecute federal crimes. In addition to these practical concerns, the Court also held that preserving the silver platter doctrine in the face of increasing acceptance of the exclusionary rule by state courts compromised the integrity of the state governments, the federal government,

59. Justice Traynor later recounted his personal conversion from exclusionary rule critic to supporter in a thoughtful essay. Roger J. Traynor, *Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States*, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 321–22 (1962).

60. *See* *People v. Cahan*, 282 P.2d 905, 913 (Cal. 1955) (describing the available remedies before the Supreme Court of California adopted the exclusionary rule).

61. *Id.*

62. 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955).

63. *Id.* at 911–13.

64. *Elkins v. United States*, 364 U.S. 206, 220–21 (1960).

65. *Id.* at 221 (“Yet when a federal court sitting in an exclusionary state admits evidence lawlessly seized by state agents, it not only frustrates state policy, but frustrates that policy in a particularly inappropriate and ironic way. For by admitting the unlawfully seized evidence the federal court serves to defeat the state’s effort to assure obedience to the Federal Constitution.”).

and the federal courts, when federal courts endorsed by implication the unlawful conduct of state agents.⁶⁶

The Court confirmed the views expressed in *Elkins* a year later in *Mapp v. Ohio*, which incorporated the exclusionary rule to the states.⁶⁷ *Mapp* was based on the proposition that “the rule excluding in federal criminal trials evidence which is the product of an illegal search and seizure is ‘part and parcel’ of the Fourth Amendment.”⁶⁸ In making its case, the Court reprised the experiences of various states and concluded that remedies other than exclusion had proved to be “worthless and futile” as means to punish and deter law enforcement misconduct.⁶⁹ The Court also confirmed that the exclusionary rule is “an essential part of the right to privacy” embodied in the Fourth Amendment and that failing to require exclusion when state agents violate the Fourth Amendment would be “to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.”⁷⁰ Emphasizing that rules matter, the *Mapp* Court held categorically that “no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence.”⁷¹ Finally, following Justice Stewart in *Elkins* and Justice Holmes in *Silverthorne*, the Court pointed out that exclusion is required by both “the imperative of judicial integrity” and the principle that governments must obey the rules that govern them in order to maintain their own moral authority.⁷²

Elkins and *Mapp* leave no doubt about the Court's view that the silver platter doctrine offended the Fourth Amendment itself by allowing officers to exploit illegally seized evidence in collateral proceedings. In addition to these principled concerns, the Court also had before it persuasive evidence that the exclusionary rule was a singularly effective tool for securing Fourth Amendment protections, but that its effectiveness was compromised by opening the door to admission of illegally seized evidence in collateral forums. This practical concern was particularly salient, the Court noted, given the close working relationships between state and federal law enforcement officers,⁷³ which highlighted for each the paths by which they could readily circumnavigate the Fourth Amendment. The only solution, the Court held, was to block those collateral channels.⁷⁴ Unfortunately, those dams have not held.

66. *Id.* at 222–23.

67. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).

68. *Id.* at 678 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

69. *Id.* at 651–53, 657–58; *see also id.* at 669–72 (Douglas, J., concurring) (agreeing that the exclusionary rule is the best remedy to deter law enforcement misconduct).

70. *Id.* at 656.

71. *Id.* at 657.

72. *Id.* at 659; *see id.* (“Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence.”).

73. *Elkins v. United States*, 364 U.S. 206, 211 (1960).

74. *Id.* at 223.

IV. The Rise of the Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine

In a series of cases beginning with *United States v. Calandra*, the Court has declined to enforce the exclusionary rule when government officials seek to introduce illegally seized evidence during collateral proceedings including grand jury investigations,⁷⁵ civil tax suits,⁷⁶ habeas proceedings,⁷⁷ immigration removal procedures,⁷⁸ and parole revocation hearings.⁷⁹ By creating these exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, the Court has incrementally rehabilitated the silver platter doctrine that it condemned in *Elkins*. In the process, the Court has also recreated the same kinds of systemic incentives to violate the Fourth Amendment that the *Elkins* Court found had “frustrate[ed] . . . in a particularly ironic way” efforts to curb unreasonable searches and seizures.⁸⁰

The question for the Court in *Calandra* was whether evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment could be admitted directly or by implication in a grand jury investigation.⁸¹ Federal agents had conducted a search of Calandra’s place of business under authority of a warrant granting leave to search for evidence relating to an alleged gambling operation.⁸² The agents found no such evidence, but did find promissory notes and a card indicating Calandra’s receipt of periodic payments from a suspected loan-sharking victim.⁸³ Despite the fact that these debt instruments were neither within the scope of the warrant nor obviously criminal in nature, the agents seized them.⁸⁴

The United States Attorney impaneled a special grand jury to investigate allegations of loan-sharking.⁸⁵ Calandra was subpoenaed to testify.⁸⁶ Although he planned to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, Calandra feared that he would be forced to testify under a limited grant of immunity.⁸⁷ He therefore sought to bar the United States Attorney from soliciting during grand jury proceedings

75. *United States v. Calandra*, 414 U.S. 338, 354–55 (1974).

76. *United States v. Janis*, 428 U.S. 433, 459–60 (1976).

77. *Stone v. Powell*, 428 U.S. 465, 494–96 (1976).

78. *INS v. Lopez-Mendoza*, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1984).

79. *Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott*, 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998).

80. *See supra* note 65 and accompanying text.

81. *United States v. Calandra*, 414 U.S. 338, 339 (1974).

82. *Id.* at 340.

83. *Id.* at 340–41.

84. *See id.* (describing the evidence seized as including the card and “various other items, including books and records of the company, stock certificates, and address books”).

85. *Id.* at 341.

86. *Id.*

87. *See id.* (describing Calandra’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege when asked about the seized evidence and his request to postpone the hearing on the Government’s application for immunity in order to prepare a motion to suppress that evidence).

any testimony based on the illegally seized evidence.⁸⁸ Calandra subsequently sought return of the debt instruments alleging that the warrant was not supported by probable cause and that, at any rate, the officers exceeded the scope of the warrant when they seized the instruments.⁸⁹ That motion was granted.⁹⁰ The Sixth Circuit affirmed.⁹¹ The Supreme Court reversed,⁹² and, in doing so, contradicted the core holding in *Elkins*.

Elkins and *Mapp* stand for the proposition that consistency in enforcement among forums is essential as a matter of both principle and practicality. To allow any government agent to use illegally seized evidence in some proceedings while excluding it in others cuts the Fourth Amendment at root and leaf by compromising both the integrity of the right and the capacity of the exclusionary rule to deter by “removing the incentive to disregard [the Fourth Amendment].”⁹³

Calandra and subsequent collateral use cases recreate what *Elkins* forbade. Specifically, by allowing illegally seized evidence to be admitted in collateral proceedings, the Court has created powerful incentives for law enforcement officers and other government agents to violate the Fourth Amendment. It has done so without even acknowledging its departure from *Elkins*. Worse still, the Court has repeatedly relied upon *Elkins* for the proposition that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter law enforcement officers by removing incentives to violate the Fourth Amendment without acknowledging or addressing the fact that these considerations were precisely those which led the Court to reject the original silver platter doctrine.⁹⁴ That omission is particularly galling because the collateral use exceptions have constructed a series of contemporary silver platter doctrines in various forums that individually and collectively provide significant incentives for government agents to ignore fundamental Fourth Amendment rights.

It might be objected at this point that we are being wholly unfair to the Court by suggesting that its holdings in *Calandra* and subsequent collateral use cases create contemporary silver platter doctrines and therefore contradict the Court's holding in *Elkins*.⁹⁵ Then-Professor Easterbrook gave

88. *See id.* at 341–42 (recounting that, after Calandra's motion to suppress, “the District Court entered its judgment ordering the evidence suppressed and returned to Calandra and further ordering that Calandra need not answer any of the grand jury's questions based on the suppressed evidence”).

89. *Id.* at 341.

90. *Id.*

91. *Id.* at 342.

92. *Id.* at 341–42.

93. *Elkins v. United States*, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).

94. *See, e.g., Calandra*, 414 U.S. at 347–48 (stating that the exclusionary rule protects Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect (citing *Elkins*, 364 U.S. at 217)); *United States v. Janis*, 428 U.S. 433, 445–46 (1976) (noting that although state officials could admit evidence that the exclusionary rule barred federal officials from admitting, state officials would be deterred by the prohibition on federal officials (citing *Elkins*, 364 U.S. at 223)).

95. We are in debt to Orin Kerr for pressing this concern.

voice to this concern three decades ago in *Ways of Criticizing the Court*.⁹⁶ There, Easterbrook argued that the fundamental dynamics of the Court's institutional structure make inconsistent decisions inevitable.⁹⁷ His case was built upon insights from public choice theory, in particular on Kenneth Arrow's groundbreaking Impossibility Theorem, for which Arrow won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.⁹⁸ Easterbrook's conclusions, and the application of public choice theory to the Court, have since been topics of hot debate among public choice theorists.⁹⁹ Although fascinating, those contests are beyond the scope of this Article. For present purposes we therefore will accept Easterbrook's conclusion *arguendo* because it provides an opportunity to clarify and deepen our objection to the Court's creation of contemporary silver platter doctrines. We take up this task in the next section.

V. The Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine's Spectacular Non Sequitur

Although Easterbrook argues that it is unfair and unproductive to accuse the Court of inconsistency among decisions, he maintains that it is completely within bounds to object if the Court's logic within a given case is incoherent or if its reasons are insufficient to justify its conclusions.¹⁰⁰ Although we are uncomfortable with the contradiction between *Elkins* and the cases that create contemporary silver platter doctrines, that discomfort is derivative. Our core concerns, which we explore in this Part and those that follow, are that the Court's reasons in *Calandra* and other collateral use cases are insufficient to support its conclusions and that, as a consequence, the Court has created pathological incentives for law enforcement officers to violate the Fourth Amendment. Our argument gets traction by taking

96. Frank H. Easterbrook, *Ways of Criticizing the Court*, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982).

97. *Id.* at 811–32.

98. For a concise and available explanation of the Arrow Theorem, see MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 107–09, 138–51 (2009).

99. *See, e.g.*, MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 3 (2000) (arguing social choice theory is “uniquely suited” to understanding the Supreme Court’s decision-making rules); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, *Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics*, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2127 (1990) (arguing that social choice theory, conceived properly, does not threaten the legitimacy of democratic decision making); David Post & Steven C. Salop, *Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels*, 80 GEO. L.J. 743, 747 (1992) (applying Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem to multi-judge panels); John M. Rogers, “I Vote this Way Because I’m Wrong”: *The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenides*, 79 KY. L.J. 439, 469 (1991) (criticizing Easterbrook’s use of social choice theory).

100. *See* Easterbrook, *supra* note 96, at 830 (describing cases of “judicial self-contradiction” as “easy cases”).

seriously the Court's insistence that the sole justification of the exclusionary rule is its capacity to deter law enforcement officers.¹⁰¹

Writing for the Court in *Calandra*, Justice Powell cites *Elkins* to support the foundational premise that the "[exclusionary] rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment."¹⁰² Given the threat of exclusion at a criminal trial, Justice Powell asserts that "extension" of the rule to grand jury proceedings "would deter only police investigation consciously directed toward the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand jury investigation."¹⁰³ The Court's logic here indulges what H.L.A. Hart described in different circumstances as a "spectacular *non sequitur*"¹⁰⁴ and as a consequence claims too much.

Hart leveled his charge against Jeremy Bentham's attempts to reconstruct common law culpability excuses based solely on utilitarian grounds.¹⁰⁵ The common law's interest in culpability, and its complementary willingness to excuse based on infancy, insanity, and mistakes of fact, is a consequence of the dominant role played by moral considerations and retributivist theories of punishment in its development.¹⁰⁶ Bentham rejected retributivism but nevertheless wanted to preserve these excuses. He therefore attempted to reconstruct them on deterrence grounds.¹⁰⁷ His argument is built on a straightforward insight: by virtue of their infancy, insanity, or mistake, inculpable offenders are not aware that they are breaking the law and therefore do not fear punishment. Because the threat of punishment plays no role in their decision making, Bentham argues that it would be "inefficacious" to punish them.¹⁰⁸ Because punishing offenders

101. This is a relatively recent commitment and represents a shift from the Court's focus on constitutional principle and institutional integrity in *Weeks* and *Mapp*. For a brief history of this shift, see generally Gray, *supra* note 19.

102. *Calandra v. United States*, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). As is pointed out below, this selective citation to *Elkins* ignores that decision's further reliance on constitutional principles, including the "imperative" of preserving judicial and governmental integrity. *Elkins v. United States*, 364 U.S. 206, 222–23 (1960).

103. *Calandra*, 414 U.S. at 351. The Court has yet to make good on Justice Powell's threat to inflict exclusion in cases where officers violate the Fourth Amendment with a specific design on advancing a grand jury investigation. Given the Court's willingness to turn a blind eye to law enforcement policies and practices that exploit exceptions to the exclusionary rule to license Fourth Amendment violations in *United States v. Payner*, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), decided a mere six years after *Calandra*, there is little reason to believe that it ever will. See *infra* notes 264–77 and accompanying text.

104. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 19 (1968). For a more extensive exegesis and explanation of how Hart's critique applies to other components of the Court's Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule jurisprudence, see generally Gray, *supra* note 19.

105. HART, *supra* note 104, at 19.

106. For a brief sketch of these retributivist commitments, see David Gray, *Punishment as Suffering*, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1656–72 (2010).

107. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 161–62 (1789).

108. *Id.* at 167.

who are undeterrable serves no crime-control purpose, Bentham concludes that there is no justification for inflicting punishment in cases where culpability is absent.¹⁰⁹

Hart's charge of non sequitur is meant to show that Bentham's efforts fall well short of justifying general culpability excuses. Rather, Hart writes,

[A]ll that [Bentham] proves (at the most) is the quite different proposition that the *threat* of punishment will be ineffective so far as the class of persons who suffer from these conditions is concerned. Plainly it is possible that though (as Bentham says) the *threat* of punishment could not have operated on them, the actual *infliction* of punishment on those persons, may secure a higher measure of conformity to law on the part of normal persons than is secured by the admission of excusing conditions.¹¹⁰

It is a straightforward but powerful point along at least two dimensions. The first is temporal. Although it is absolutely true that punishing an inculpable offender will not have deterred him from his past offense, it does not follow that inflicting punishment now will not deter him from future offenses, particularly if his past offense was a function of ignorance or mistake that can be avoided in the future. The second dimension draws on the distinction between specific and general deterrence. Even if punishing an inculpable offender will not serve any additional deterrence purpose with respect to him, overall utility may still be served by the deterrent effect that his punishment will have on other potential offenders.¹¹¹ Furthermore, as Hart points out, a punitive regime uncomplicated by excuses may provide greater deterrence precisely because potential offenders cannot entertain the possibility of escaping punishment by malingering.¹¹²

The Court's logic in *Calandra* follows Bentham's reconstruction of common law defenses and is therefore equally vulnerable to Hart's critique. Recall that the Court starts with the proposition that the only reason to inflict the exclusionary rule in any given case is its potential to deter the offending officer and other similarly situated officers from perpetrating Fourth Amendment violations in the future.¹¹³ Because, by hypothesis, officers who engage in searches are primarily interested in securing evidence that will be admissible at trial, the Court concludes that enforcing the exclusionary rule in grand jury proceedings "would deter only police investigation consciously

109. See *id.* at 166–67 (arguing that under the principle of utility "[i]t is plain . . . punishment ought not to be inflicted . . . where it must be *inefficacious*: where it cannot act so as to prevent the mischief").

110. HART, *supra* note 104, at 19.

111. Gary Becker has suggested a similar conclusion. Gary S. Becker, *Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach*, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 170 (1968); see also *id.* at 204 ("The anticipation of conviction and punishment reduces the loss from offenses and thus increases social welfare by discouraging some offenders.").

112. HART, *supra* note 104, at 19.

113. See *supra* note 102 and accompanying text.

directed toward the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand jury investigation.”¹¹⁴ As Hart’s critique of Bentham suggests, this conclusion does not follow. First, it is not necessary that an officer be interested “solely” in grand jury proceedings. He may well be deterred if grand jury proceedings are among a series of law enforcement goals. Second, and following Hart, although it might be true in any given case that the *threat* of exclusion in the grand jury context may not deter an officer who is neither aware of nor interested in grand jury proceedings, exclusion in the grand jury context surely would add to the general deterrent threat against all officers.¹¹⁵

This is a narrow point to be sure. It is nevertheless revelatory. Recall that our initial concern with *Calandra* was that it creates a contemporary silver platter doctrine.¹¹⁶ Our objection is not simply that doing so contradicts the Court’s holding in *Elkins*. Rather, our concern is that the Court’s field of vision in *Calandra* and its progeny is artificially constrained by the spectacular non sequitur, blinding it both to the deterrence potential of the exclusionary rule in these cases and to the positive incentives it is creating for police to violate the Fourth Amendment.¹¹⁷ In the remainder of this Article, we argue that the Court has routinely indulged the spectacular non sequitur when justifying the collateral use doctrine. As a result, the Court has consistently misidentified the constituents of its deterrence calculation. As a consequence of this miscalculation, the Court has created a series of powerful incentives for a whole range of government agents to violate Fourth Amendment rights. The Court’s primary concern in *Elkins* was to eliminate these incentives out of respect for general deterrence goals lest the Court promote Fourth Amendment violations.¹¹⁸ Although we would prefer to see consistency in the Court’s jurisprudence, our core objection here is not that the Court has serially contradicted the holding in *Elkins*. Rather, our concern is that the Court has ignored the wisdom of *Elkins*. We begin with grand jury proceedings, the collateral forum at stake in *Calandra*.

VI. The Pathological Consequences of the Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine

A. *Grand Jury Proceedings*

Calandra established an exception to the exclusionary rule for grand jury proceedings and thereby initiated a series of cases reconstituting the

114. *United States v. Calandra*, 414 U.S. 338, 351 (1974).

115. This is essentially the same point endorsed by the Court in its investigative-use cases, where it has barred officers from exploiting illegally seized evidence to advance their investigations, without regard for whether their intentions when violating the Fourth Amendment were to seize evidence for later admission at trial. *See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471, 484–91 (1963).

116. *See supra* notes 75–79 and accompanying text.

117. *See supra* notes 65–66, 93–94 and accompanying text.

118. *See supra* notes 65–66 and accompanying text.

silver platter doctrine.¹¹⁹ The Court justified opening a collateral avenue for the admission and use of illegally seized evidence on the ground that officers are engaged in detecting and securing evidence for criminal trials, and that, therefore, suppressing evidence in grand jury proceedings would only deter officers who are “solely” interested in obtaining evidence for a grand jury proceeding.¹²⁰ This reasoning marks a clear instance of the spectacular non sequitur. Although it may well be true that the threat of exclusion in grand jury proceedings does not threaten officers who are not thinking about the grand jury when they violate the Fourth Amendment, this does not mean that actual enforcement of the exclusionary rule in the grand jury will not secure a higher measure of conformity with the Fourth Amendment in general, particularly given the central role of the grand jury in many law enforcement officers’ lives. As we will argue in this Part, taking note of the role of the spectacular non sequitur in the Court’s logic in *Calandra* reveals that its deterrence calculations are artificially constrained and naïve, and that its holding therefore incentivizes Fourth Amendment violations.

Although the grand jury is technically not an adversarial proceeding and does not engage in determinations of guilt or innocence,¹²¹ it has a long history in our criminal justice system as a check on law enforcement.¹²² In this role, the grand jury’s task in felony cases is to decide whether evidence arrayed by the government demonstrates probable cause sufficient to justify prosecution.¹²³ The Fifth Amendment provides a right to a grand jury indictment in the federal courts.¹²⁴ That right has not been incorporated to the states,¹²⁵ but around half of the states nevertheless require a grand jury indictment for serious crimes.¹²⁶ Where it is in use, the grand jury also serves critical law enforcement functions during investigations.¹²⁷ Because it has expansive subpoena powers, the grand jury can make demands on witnesses that police and prosecutors cannot.¹²⁸ As a consequence, law enforcement investigations often are conducted in conjunction with the grand jury.¹²⁹ When this is the case, the grand jury stands not between arrest and

119. See *supra* notes 75–79 and accompanying text.

120. *United States v. Calandra*, 414 U.S. 338, 351 (1974).

121. John C. Erb, Discussion of Recent Decisions, *An Unexcited View of United States v. Calandra*, 51 CHL.-KENT L. REV. 212, 214 (1974).

122. *Id.* at 213 (citing *Hale v. Henkel*, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906) and *Wood v. Georgia*, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962)).

123. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 303–04 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining that the grand jury serves as a “shield” that protects citizens from unfounded prosecution).

124. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . .”).

125. *Hurtado v. California*, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).

126. WEAVER, *supra* note 123, at 304.

127. Erb, *supra* note 121, at 213.

128. WEAVER, *supra* note 123, at 309.

129. *Id.*

indictment, but as the gatekeeper on arrest, and is therefore a primary forum of concern for law enforcement officers.

By creating a silver platter doctrine for grand jury proceedings, *Calandra* gives officers license to violate the Fourth Amendment in order to achieve their immediate professional goals. Whether wearing its investigator or its guardian hat, the grand jury figures prominently in the immediate interests of law enforcement agents—and often looms much larger than a criminal trial.¹³⁰ Police officers usually are rated and compensated based on arrests rather than convictions.¹³¹ As a consequence, securing a grand jury indictment is an end in itself from an officer's point of view. This is obviously the case where the grand jury is conducting an original investigation and its decision to return a true bill stands between the officer and a closed case file. It is also true in cases where the grand jury is acting as a gatekeeper between arrest and indictment. Should the grand jury decline to indict, the case will remain open, a red mark on the officer's record waiting to go black.¹³² As a consequence, police officers have an immediate interest in obtaining evidence sufficient to support an indictment. By contrast, criminal trials frequently do not go forward for months or years after an arrest,¹³³ and acquittals seldom result in a closed case's being reopened unless there is evidence that the person put on trial was actually innocent.¹³⁴ It follows that, from a deterrence point of view, law enforcement officers care a great deal about the outcome of grand jury proceedings, even if it is not their "sole" concern.

By creating a blanket silver platter doctrine under which illegally seized evidence can be admitted during grand jury proceedings, the *Calandra* Court introduced powerful and immediate incentives for officers to violate the Fourth Amendment.¹³⁵ That incentive is even more compelling given the significant role of plea bargaining in our justice system. The vast majority of criminal prosecutions are resolved by plea bargain rather than at trial.¹³⁶ In 2009 alone, 97% of convictions entered in federal courts were based on

130. Christopher Slobogin, *Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule*, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 377.

131. *Id.* at 377 n.47. Slobogin cited sociological literature about both Philadelphia and New York police officers to reach this conclusion. *Id.* According to these studies, the primary goal of law enforcement is to get a "collar." *Id.* at 47.

132. Floyd Feeney, *Police Clearances: A Poor Way to Measure the Impact of Miranda on the Police*, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 13 (2000).

133. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 15 (5th ed. 2009).

134. *Cf.* Feeney, *supra* note 132, at 17 (noting that police departments would consider a case "exceptionally" cleared so long as the department was satisfied that the individual arrested actually committed the crime). In other words, an actually innocent individual cannot be supposed to have actually committed the crime in question.

135. William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, *The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law*, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 385–88 (1981).

136. Stephanos Bibas, *Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial*, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2466 (2004).

guilty pleas.¹³⁷ An indictment, or the threat of an indictment, gives prosecutors incredible bargaining power during plea negotiations. The prospect of having this leverage not only provides officers with an immediate incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment in order to secure evidence that can be presented to the grand jury, it encourages prosecutors to look the other way and provides them with explicit license to exploit the fruits of Fourth Amendment violations.¹³⁸ The silver platter doctrine created in *Calandra* therefore goes beyond encouraging police officers to violate the Fourth Amendment; it also threatens the moral integrity of prosecutors as agents of justice by creating incentives for them to exploit and therefore endorse illegal searches and seizures.

The incentive for police officers and prosecutors to violate the Fourth Amendment is particularly strong in organized crime and conspiracy cases.¹³⁹ Here the dominant investigative and prosecutorial strategy is to leverage relatively minor participants with the threat of lengthy sentences in order to secure their cooperation and testimony.¹⁴⁰ These are not cases on the margin. The investigation and prosecution of drug conspiracies dominate contemporary law enforcement practice.¹⁴¹ With the grand jury silver platter doctrine in place, beat cops and detectives have daily incentives to commit routine Fourth Amendment violations as they troll for the small fish needed to catch the bigger fish.¹⁴²

This iteration of the contemporary silver platter doctrine has a further consequence, which is to draw a veil over the actual conduct of law enforcement. In his *Calandra* dissent, Justice Brennan expressed his unease with the prospect that the majority's opinion left the door ajar for law enforcement officers to violate the Fourth Amendment at will.¹⁴³ The

137. MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 234184, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2009, at 12 (2011).

138. Slobogin, *supra* note 130, at 375 n.37.

139. Joseph J. Barone, Note, *Calandra—The Present Status of the Exclusionary Rule*, 4 CAP. U. L. REV. 95, 105 (1975).

140. See Neal Kumar Katyal, *Conspiracy Theory*, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1309–20 (2003) (analyzing the economic and psychological impacts of group criminal activity and highlighting the functional benefits of a more vibrant conspiracy doctrine).

141. See, e.g., *International Drug Smuggling Conspiracy at Philadelphia International Airport Stopped by HSI Special Agents, Airline Employee Conspirator Sentenced*, ICE (Oct. 2, 2012), <http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1210/121002philadelphia.htm> (quoting the Special Agent in Charge as saying, “[B]ringing individuals engaged in international drug trafficking to justice is a high [Homeland Security Investigations] priority”); *Leader of Oxycodone Trafficking Ring Sentenced to Over 10 Years in Prison*, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN. (Sept. 11, 2012), <http://www.justice.gov/dea/divisions/atl/2012/atl091112.shtml> (quoting the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of North Carolina as saying, “The prosecution of individuals involved in the illegal distribution of prescription pain pills is a top priority for this Office”).

142. See Katyal, *supra* note 140, at 1328–29 (discussing the necessity of “flipping” coconspirators in securing many convictions and guilty pleas).

143. *United States v. Calandra*, 414 U.S. 338, 365 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Katyal, *supra* note 140, at 1333 (noting the incentive for law enforcement to create “mechanisms to intercept communications between conspirators”).

institutional analysis we have presented gives considerable weight to his concerns. Perhaps more worrisome is that the inability of defendants to litigate Fourth Amendment issues at the grand jury stage,¹⁴⁴ combined with the prominent role of plea bargaining in our system, make it impossible to discover the extent of the epidemic. That mystery is discomfiting itself, but also bespeaks a broad abdication of the judiciary's role as a Fourth Amendment guardian and check on law enforcement officers¹⁴⁵ engaged in the "competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."¹⁴⁶

B. *Immigration Proceedings*¹⁴⁷

The Court placed immigration removal hearings outside the scope of the exclusionary rule in *INS v. Lopez-Mendoza*.¹⁴⁸ The respondents in *Lopez-Mendoza* were arrested at their workplaces and subsequently gave statements tending to show that they had entered and remained in the United States illegally.¹⁴⁹ At their deportation hearings, each sought without success to terminate his proceeding citing violations of his Fourth Amendment rights.¹⁵⁰ Based in part on their own statements, they were each found deportable and their subsequent appeals to the Board of Immigration Appeals were dismissed.¹⁵¹ The Ninth Circuit was more sympathetic, however, holding that the exclusionary rule bars admission of statements taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment in civil deportation hearings.¹⁵² Extending the reach of its contemporary silver platter doctrine, the Supreme Court reversed.¹⁵³

The Court's reasoning in *Lopez-Mendoza* is built around the same spectacular non sequitur introduced in *Calandra*. Specifically, the Court

144. Mertens & Wasserstrom, *supra* note 135, at 387–88.

145. *Id.* at 396–97.

146. *Johnson v. United States*, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).

147. The authors are grateful for feedback received from Professors Ingrid Eagly, Maureen Sweeney, and Kathy Vaughns on this subpart.

148. 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1984). That rule has been modified slightly by the Board of Immigration Appeals, which will enforce the exclusionary rule in "egregious" cases that implicate "fundamental fairness." *See, e.g., In re Toro*, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340 (BIA 1980) (noting that, to be admissible in deportation proceedings, evidence must be probative and its use be fundamentally fair, such that it does not deprive the defendant of his Fifth Amendment rights, and further noting that, in certain cases, the manner in which evidence is seized may be so egregious as to offend Fifth Amendment due process rights). Cases in which that rule has been applied are few and far between, however, and do little to alter the core shift in incentives accomplished by *Lopez-Mendoza*. *See* Stella Burch Elias, "Good Reason to Believe": *Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza*, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1124–40 (describing how *Lopez-Mendoza* has led to widespread violations of Fourth Amendment rights).

149. 468 U.S. at 1035–38.

150. *Id.* Specifically, Elias Sandoval-Sanchez challenged the evidence INS offered as the fruit of an illegal arrest, while Adan Lopez-Mendoza initially limited his challenge to the legality of his arrest. *Id.* at 1035–36.

151. *Id.*

152. *Id.* at 1036, 1038.

153. *Id.* at 1050–51.

argued that law enforcement officers are primarily interested in criminal law enforcement, not immigration enforcement, and that imposing the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings therefore offers little or no additional deterrence benefit beyond that provided by the threat of suppression in criminal trials.¹⁵⁴ This, of course, is another iteration of the spectacular non sequitur. To paraphrase H.L.A. Hart, although it may well be true that the threat of exclusion in removal proceedings does not threaten officers who are not thinking about removal proceedings when they violate the Fourth Amendment, this does not mean that actual enforcement of the exclusionary rule in removal hearings will not secure a higher measure of conformity with the Fourth Amendment in general.¹⁵⁵ Hart's point takes on particular weight here because, in addition to indulging a non sequitur, the Court in *Lopez-Mendoza* ignored the large cadre of government officials whose primary duty is to pursue removal. It also rested its holding on a naïve view of the deep relationships between criminal law enforcement and immigration enforcement.¹⁵⁶ As the Court pointed out in *Padilla v. Kentucky*,¹⁵⁷ "deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes."¹⁵⁸ Moreover, prosecuting removal is often a primary goal of law enforcement officers. That is certainly true of immigration enforcement agents, to whom the Court effectively grants a license to violate the Fourth Amendment,¹⁵⁹ but it is also increasingly true of state and local police officers.¹⁶⁰

In the years since *Lopez-Mendoza* was decided in 1984, immigration enforcement and removal have become an increasingly central law enforcement obsession. Political pressure and demagoguery about immigration has a long history in America,¹⁶¹ but contemporary passions have their roots in the late decades of the twentieth century and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.¹⁶² In 1996, Congress passed a law

154. *Id.* at 1042–46.

155. HART, *supra* note 104, at 19.

156. See Elias, *supra* note 148, at 1121 (citing internal correspondence among the Justices documenting their view that immigration enforcement was "purely civil" in nature and did not involve criminal punishment).

157. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).

158. *Id.* at 1480.

159. Gray, *supra* note 19, at 61–62.

160. See Ingrid V. Eagly, *Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070*, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1749, 1767–805 (2011) (examining the relationship between local immigration prosecution and federal immigration law); Elias, *supra* note 148, at 1135–40 (citing allegations of Fourth Amendment violations as the Justice Department has invoked the "war on terror" to justify increasing immigration enforcement via state and local police officers).

161. See generally HUMPHREY J. DESMOND, *THE KNOW-NOTHING PARTY: A SKETCH* (1905).

162. See e.g., Steven A. Holmes, *Candidates Criticized for Sound-Bite Approach to Problem of Illegal Aliens*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1996, at B10 (reporting on the immigration debate between Pat Buchanan and Bob Dole during the Republican primary season).

empowering state and local authorities to enforce some federal immigration laws.¹⁶³ The year that law went into force, 69,680 aliens were removed from the United States.¹⁶⁴ A year later that number rose to 114,432.¹⁶⁵ It continued to rise in subsequent years, reaching 174,813 by 1998.¹⁶⁶ Those numbers alone provide substantial evidence that immigration enforcement, and therefore removal, had become a central focus for law enforcement by the late 1990s. Then came the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), which brought immigration and border security to the top of the political agenda nationwide.

The creation of new agencies and passage of new federal and local laws in the wake of 9/11 made immigration matters an even more central feature of law enforcement consciousness at the federal, state, and local levels. Created in 2003, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the principal investigative unit of the Department of Homeland Security, where it holds a diverse brief of criminal and immigration matters.¹⁶⁷ With over 20,000 employees, ICE is also the second largest investigative unit in the federal government behind the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).¹⁶⁸ For ICE officers, immigration enforcement and removal is a primary investigative goal. After *Lopez-Mendoza*, it is a goal that they are free to pursue beyond effective Fourth Amendment review.¹⁶⁹

As the federal government has expanded its commitment to immigration enforcement, it has also developed extensive cooperative relationships with local and state law enforcement agencies, bringing removal proceedings closer to the fronts of the minds of law enforcement officers who had been concerned primarily with traditional crime-control matters.¹⁷⁰ Soon after

163. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252c (2006) (authorizing state and local authorities to arrest and detain illegal aliens who have previously been convicted of a felony or who reenter the United States without permission of the Attorney General after deportation).

164. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2010 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 94 tbl.36 (2011) (Aliens Removed or Returned: Fiscal Years 1892 to 2010) [hereinafter 2010 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2010/ois_yb_2010.pdf.

165. *Id.* As Maureen Sweeney explains, the history of current immigration law is complex and no one change or development is responsible for the dramatic rise in immigration removals since the mid-1990s. Maureen A. Sweeney, *Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construction of Immigration Removal for Crimes*, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 47, 60–67 (2010). It is beyond our means or purposes here to offer a contrary reductivist explanation. Rather, our point is that the rise both signifies and engenders heightened focus on immigration enforcement among law enforcement officers at all levels.

166. 2010 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, *supra* note 164, at 94 tbl.36.

167. *About ICE*, ICE, <http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/>.

168. *Id.*; see also *Quick Facts*, FBI, <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/quick-facts> (reporting that “[o]n September 30, 2012, [the FBI] had a total of 36,074 employees”).

169. *Cf.* *United States v. Calandra*, 414 U.S. 338, 366 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Court’s departure from the exclusionary rule in the grand jury context as a betrayal of the Court’s role in upholding constitutional rights).

170. See Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, *Undocumented Criminal Procedure*, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1545–52 (2011) (arguing that immigration violations are being used “as a pretext for

9/11, President George W. Bush's administration announced plans to integrate local police as a massive "force multiplier" to assist overburdened federal immigration agencies.¹⁷¹ The explicit goal was to expand the scope of state and local authorities to enforce civil immigration laws.¹⁷² The Immigration and Naturalization Service and its successor, the Department of Homeland Security, advanced this goal by several means. To start, these agencies began entering civil immigration information into the National Crime Information Center, which is a crime and offender database maintained by the FBI.¹⁷³ This allowed every "local police officer writing a traffic ticket to determine [whether] a violator is subject to a deportation order."¹⁷⁴ Federal officials also began attending local law enforcement meetings to encourage state and local officers to make enforcing federal immigration law a part of their ordinary policing practices.¹⁷⁵

In 2002, pursuant to Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,¹⁷⁶ federal agencies began entering into explicit agreements with state and local agencies to enforce federal immigration laws. These "287(g) programs" enable local agencies to combine law enforcement with the "function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation,

investigating state criminal law"); Eagly, *supra* note 160, at 1777–84 (demonstrating the increased focus on removal proceedings by state and local authorities); Igrid V. Eagly, *Prosecuting Immigration*, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1341–42 (2010) (noting that as a result of the 287(g) programs, "state and local police can choose whether they are acting in their criminal capacity . . . or in their administrative capacity"); Elias, *supra* note 148, at 1135–40 (highlighting the constitutional violations that have resulted from the cooperation of the federal government and state and local police in immigration enforcement matters).

171. HANNAH GLADSTEIN ET AL., *MIGRATION POLICY INST., N.Y.U. SCH. LAW, BLURRING THE LINES: A PROFILE OF STATE AND LOCAL POLICE ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAW USING THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL INFORMATION CENTER DATABASE, 2002–2004*, at 9 (2005), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI_report_Blurring_the_Lines_120805.pdf; *see also* Kris W. Kobach, *The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests*, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 181 (2005) ("The nearly 800,000 police officers nationwide represent a massive force multiplier.").

172. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Apr. 3, 2002), *available at* <https://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf>. The government initially refused to release the memo, but was ultimately forced to do so under the Freedom of Information Act. *See Nat'l Council of La Raza v. DOJ*, 411 F.3d 350, 360–61 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the memo was not exempted from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act).

173. Mary Beth Sheridan, *INS Seeks Law Enforcement in Aid in Crackdown: Move Targets 300,000 Foreign Nationals Living in U.S. Despite Deportation Orders*, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2001, at A25.

174. *Id.*; *see also* Michael J. Wishnie, *State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws*, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1085 (2004) (noting that this strategy was central to the "war on terror" after the 9/11 attacks).

175. *Id.* at 1087 n.16 (citing Minutes from the Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Advisory Policy Board Meeting 45–48 (June 4–5, 2003), which note "statements made by Kris Kobach, Office of the Attorney General").

176. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. I, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-563–64 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006)).

apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States.”¹⁷⁷ The 287(g) programs also provide extensive training for local law enforcement officers on immigration enforcement matters.¹⁷⁸ Part of this training involves the use of “*Blackie's*” warrants,¹⁷⁹ which sanction immigration searches based on less than probable cause and also do not require a particularized description of the place to be searched.¹⁸⁰ These warrants fall well short of basic Fourth Amendment standards, and are now at the disposal of local law enforcement agencies that accept co-responsibility for enforcing federal immigration laws.¹⁸¹ As of 2012, ICE had entered into 287(g) agreements with fifty-seven law enforcement agencies in twenty-one states.¹⁸²

The “Secure Communities” program, inaugurated in 2008, has taken over where 287(g) left off and has further deepened the ties between federal immigration officials and local law enforcement. Secure Communities allows ICE to screen automatically local arrest data from communities in order to identify resident aliens and potential immigration violators. Secure Communities also allows federal officials to issue “detainers” that authorize local law enforcement to seize and hold suspected violators or others ICE

177. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1). This would seem to further damn the notion that alternate remedies would be available for a victim of Fourth Amendment violations as a result of immigration enforcement. *Cf. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza*, 468 U.S. 1032, 1045 (1984) (arguing that a civil remedy would still be available for victims even absent the exclusion remedy).

178. *See* U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Memorandum of Agreement, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/287g_moa.pdf. While the agreement can be modified around the edges to suit the specific agency, it is a fairly standard form.

179. These warrants are named for the case that approved them: *Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo*, 659 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Although the federal government does not publish its 287(g) training manuals, a copy of the manual followed by officers in Frederick County, MD, is available online. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, PARTICIPANT WORKBOOK (2004) [hereinafter FREDERICK COUNTY WORKBOOK], available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/21968724/ICE-287-g-Participant-Workbook-Search-and-Seizure>.

180. *Blackie's*, 659 F.2d at 1222 (reasoning that, since the warrant request arose from administrative functions of civil immigration enforcement, the more stringent standards of a criminal search warrant were unnecessary); *see also* Eagly, *supra* note 170, at 1314 (discussing *Blackie's*).

181. For example, an administrative search warrant was used in *INS v. Delgado*, 466 U.S. 210 (1984). The Frederick County training manual does draw a distinction between the requirements for criminal warrants and administrative warrants. *See* FREDERICK COUNTY WORKBOOK, *supra* note 179, at 5. In practice, however, broader power to enforce civil immigration laws through arrest and detention means local law enforcement can pick and choose whether they are acting as police investigating crime or administrative agents looking for aliens. Eagly, *supra* note 170, at 1342; *see also* William J. Stuntz, *Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line*, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 1 (1996) (suggesting that the government's natural incentive is “to evade or exploit the procedural civil-criminal line by changing the substantive civil-criminal line”). Similarly, Professors Cox and Posner have suggested that the country's underenforcement of immigration at the border, which allows millions into the country illegally, may be by design to give the government free reign to dodge constitutional protections that would be afforded to those who would otherwise enter legally under a guest-worker program. Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, *The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law*, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 813–14 (2007).

182. *Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act*, ICE, <http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm>.

believes may be potential targets for deportation.¹⁸³ Secure Communities has now expanded to 3,074 jurisdictions and is well on its way to universal coverage.¹⁸⁴

These federal outreach programs have been very successful in bringing the prospect of removal to the front of local law enforcement officers' consciousness during their normal engagements with citizens. For example, one recent study showed that 83% of the immigrants arrested during a single month in Gaston County, North Carolina, through their 287(g) program, were charged only with minor traffic violations.¹⁸⁵ This suggests that, even at the most routine level of engagement between citizens and law enforcement officers, immigration is a primary focus. If there was any doubt, officers in Colorado are now advised as a matter of policy to run immigration checks during traffic stops.¹⁸⁶ This increased focus on the prospect of removal by police has been remarkably effective. In the nine years since 287(g) went into effect, removals have more than doubled, from 165,168 in 2002 to 387,242 in 2010.¹⁸⁷ Adding to that success, recent numbers reported by ICE document 159,509 removals as a result of the Secured Communities program alone.¹⁸⁸

Anxious to be of additional service, many states have reacted to continuing complaints about illegal immigration¹⁸⁹ by enacting laws that

183. AARTI KOHLI ET AL., THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTITUTE ON LAW & SOC. POLICY, *SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS* 1–2 (2011), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf. This program is presently the target of a legal challenge mounted by students at the Yale Law School. Mary E. O'Leary, *Yale Law School Immigration Clinic Files Class Action Lawsuit Challenging Secure Communities Detainers*, NEW HAVEN REG., Feb. 22, 2012, <http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2012/02/22/news/doc4f45623a99923180233858.txt>.

184. See *Activated Jurisdictions*, ICE (Aug. 22, 2012), <http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf> (reporting that Secure Communities is active in 3,074 of 3,181 jurisdictions in the United States with plans to expand nationwide).

185. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.C. LEGAL FOUNDATION & IMMIGRATION & HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY CLINIC, UNIV. OF N.C., *THE POLICIES AND POLITICS OF LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT LAWS: 287(G) PROGRAM IN NORTH CAROLINA* 29 (2009), available at <http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/clinicalprograms/287gpolicyreview.pdf>.

186. See, e.g., COLO. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, *REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S WORKING GROUP ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION* 15–16 (2008), available at <http://cdpsweb.state.co.us/immigration/documents/FINAL%20Report%202%20for%20Eservice.pdf> (detailing Colorado state police process for contacting various databases during a traffic stop to determine if a suspect is an alien).

187. 2010 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, *supra* note 164, 94 tbl.36. To add some perspective, only 2,801 aliens were removed in 1892. *Id.* That number rose slowly to reach 50,924 in 1995. *Id.* The seven-fold increase in the last sixteen years is historically unprecedented. *Id.*

188. *Activated Jurisdictions*, *supra* note 184.

189. See, e.g., Julia Preston, *Agents' Union Stalls Training on Deportation Rules*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/us/illegal-immigrants-who-commit-crimes-focus-of-deportation.html?_r=2scp=5&sq=obama%20immigration%20enforcement&st=cse& (chronicling the debate between President Obama and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents' union on how best to enforce immigration laws); Jim Rutenberg & Jeff Zeleny, *Romney Stays on the Offense with Gingrich*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2012,

require local law enforcement officers to enforce federal immigration policy. Among the most notable are Alabama,¹⁹⁰ Arizona,¹⁹¹ Georgia,¹⁹² Indiana,¹⁹³ South Carolina,¹⁹⁴ and Utah,¹⁹⁵ each of which has passed stringent laws in recent years requiring state and local authorities to expend time and resources detecting and detaining illegal immigrants.¹⁹⁶ Many more plan to follow suit.¹⁹⁷ Most of these laws require that state and local law enforcement officers verify citizenship during any “lawful stop, detention, or arrest.”¹⁹⁸ These provisions recently were endorsed by the Supreme Court in *Arizona v. United States*,¹⁹⁹ which held that state laws requiring law enforcement officers to confirm the immigration status of persons stopped for other reasons do not offend federal supremacy in immigration matters.²⁰⁰ Some of these state laws also include provisions granting citizens standing to bring

<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/us/politics/a-grueling-day-on-the-stump-then-a-debate.html?pagewanted=1&sq=romney%20immigration%20enforcement&st=cse&scp=5> (noting the debate over immigration policies in a Republican primary debate in Florida).

190. ALA. CODE § 31-13-6 (Supp. 2012).

191. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (2012).

192. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-100 (Supp. 2012).

193. IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-18.2 (West Supp. 2012).

194. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13-170 (Supp. 2011).

195. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-1009 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). Other states have enacted laws that work at a different link on the law enforcement food chain. Tennessee amended its public safety code, requiring a procedure to verify the citizenship status of any individual who is arrested, booked, or confined for any period in any county or municipal detention facility. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-123(a) (Supp. 2011).

196. Several of these codes were the subject of legal challenges in *Arizona v. United States*, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) and elsewhere. See, e.g., *Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Ga.*, No. 11-13044, 2012 WL 3553612, at *1–2 (11th Cir. Aug. 20, 2012) (challenging provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011); *Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Governor of Ala.*, Nos. 11-14535, 11-14675, 2012 WL 3553613, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 20, 2012) (challenging provisions of the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act).

197. In the first half of 2012 alone, state legislatures introduced a combined 948 bills related to immigration. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2012 IMMIGRATION-RELATED LAWS AND RESOLUTIONS IN THE STATES (JANUARY 1–JUNE 30, 2012), at 1 (2012), available at <http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/immig/2012ImmigrationReportJuly.pdf>. Remarkably, the report noted a drop from the 1,607 immigration laws introduced by state legislatures in 2011. *Id.* at 2.

198. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-1003(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012) (requiring law enforcement to make a reasonable attempt to determine the citizenship status of an individual during any lawful stop, detention, or arrest when reasonable suspicion exists that the suspect may be an alien); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-100(b) (Supp. 2012) (authorizing law enforcement to verify immigration status when an officer has probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a criminal violation).

199. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).

200. *Id.* at 2507–10. Arizona began enforcing these provisions of its law after a federal injunction was lifted in September 2012. *United States v. Arizona*, No. 10-CV-01413-PHX-SRB, 2012 WL 4076192, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 18, 2012). Although the Court indicated that it will monitor actual enforcement of the Arizona law out of concern for equal protection, the Court's record of demanding equal treatment of immigrant groups is dismal. See Carbado & Harris, *supra* note 170, at 1557–65 (analyzing certain Court opinions that have “compounded Latinos' exposure to law enforcement surveillance, expanded law enforcement power and discretion, and facilitated racial profiling”).

civil suits against officials who fail to seek full enforcement of these provisions.²⁰¹ All of these efforts reflect and enhance a deep and broad concern for immigration matters at all levels of American society.

Given pervasive social concerns about immigration issues, the current status of federal and state laws, and increasing engagements between federal immigration officials and local law enforcement officers, it is simply implausible to suggest, as the Court did in *Lopez-Mendoza*, that law enforcement officers do not prioritize immigration enforcement or pursue it as an end in itself.²⁰² These developments have solidified immigration enforcement's place in the professional consciousness of police officers nationwide. As a consequence, it can no longer be said, if it ever could have been, that the silver platter doctrine created by the Court in *Lopez-Mendoza* does not provide significant incentives for police officers across the country to take liberties with the Fourth Amendment. For officers acting on legislative directives to enforce immigration laws, the exclusionary rule serves no deterrent purpose at all.²⁰³ The whole point, after all, is that the exclusionary rule does not apply. Any evidence they seize will be admissible in a subsequent immigration hearing regardless of Fourth Amendment concerns.²⁰⁴ After *Lopez-Mendoza*, officers are therefore encouraged to stop for any reason or for no reason at all and to engage in all manner of intrusive and unreasonable searches on little or no suspicion if there is the possibility that removal might be in the offing.²⁰⁵ In fact, this sort of systematic

201. *E.g.*, ALA. CODE § 31-13-6(d) (Supp. 2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(H) (2012). Fortunately, in the wake of the Court's *Arizona* decision, the Eleventh Circuit has invalidated some of Alabama's more onerous provisions, including ALA. CODE § 31-13-26(a), which made contracts with illegal aliens unenforceable in court. *See* *United States v. Alabama*, Nos. 11-14532, 11-14674, slip op. at 56-57 (11th Cir. Aug. 20, 2012) (holding that several provisions of the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act were preempted by federal law). Prior to the Eleventh Circuit's decision, private citizens had exercised their own brand of "ad hoc immigration justice" by refusing to pay immigrant workers for work already done and refusing to sell groceries to individuals who could not prove their immigration status. *See This American Life: Reap What You Sow*, CHICAGO PUBLIC MEDIA (Jan. 27, 2012), available at <http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/456/transcript>.

202. *See generally* Eagly, *supra* note 160; Elias, *supra* note 148. In fact, the increasing integration of criminal law and immigration law has given birth to a whole literature on "cimmigration," which even has its own blog. *See* CRIMMIGRATION, <http://www.crimmigration.com> (last updated Sept. 20, 2012) (analyzing the immigration consequences of criminal violations).

203. *See* Hiroshi Motomura, *Federal Immigration Enforcement and State and Local Arrests*, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1847 (2011) ("State and local jurisdictions and officers that see immigration enforcement as part of their law enforcement duties will be especially inclined to view civil removal as a tangible result that makes the arrest worthwhile.").

204. For that matter, it might also be admissible in a criminal trial. After all, any officer who is primarily interested in enforcing immigration policy will not be deterred by the remote threat of suppression at a criminal trial. *See infra* notes 214-24 and accompanying text. Such are the vagaries of the spectacular non sequitur.

205. Making matters worse is that there is little prosecutorial or judicial discretion in removal proceedings to temper the overzealousness of local law enforcement, meaning the arrest stage is what matters most in immigration enforcement. Motomura, *supra* note 203, at 1836, 1847. Even

violation of Fourth Amendment rights may be required by laws demanding that police officers enforce federal immigration law “to the full extent permitted.”²⁰⁶

The incentive structure created by the synergy between *Lopez-Mendoza* and contemporary immigration law and policy raises obvious equal protection concerns.²⁰⁷ Others have given powerful voice to the worries about racial profiling that bubble from this witches’ brew of federal law, local statute, and the silver platter doctrine.²⁰⁸ Allegations of racial targeting have never been remediable by the exclusionary rule, of course.²⁰⁹ We are not suggesting they should be. There is a substantial difference between remedy and reward, however. Our concern here is that the combination of *Lopez-Mendoza* and changes in the priorities of local law enforcement has

with increased prosecutorial discretion, Motomura reasons, it would do little to change the perception that immigration enforcement is racially biased. *Id.* at 1857.

206. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(A) (2012).

207. See Hiroshi Motomura, *Immigration Outside the Law*, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2064 (2008) (arguing that because immigration enforcement inherently entails the exercise of significant discretion, expanding the universe of government agents engaged in immigration enforcement necessarily raises worries about ethnic and racial discrimination); Janel Thamkul, *The Plenary Power-Shaped Hole in the Core Constitutional Law Curriculum: Exclusion, Unequal Protection, and American National Identity*, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 553, 566 (2008) (explaining that contemporary immigration policies and the judicial practices relating to those policies “have shaped the development of racism and nativism in the United States”); Michael J. Wishnie, *Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism*, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 497–98 (2001) (predicting that increased engagement by local law enforcement in immigration matters will result in discrimination). The Supreme Court recently echoed some of these concerns, but declined to act on them. *Arizona v. United States*, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2508–10 (2012) (stating that mandatory status checks and the possibility of prolonged detention while those checks are performed raises equal protection concerns).

208. See Carbado & Harris, *supra* note 170, at 1586 (arguing that the federal government’s plenary power to enforce immigration—outside typical constitutional constraints and combined with 287(g) agreements—allows local officers to expressly use race as a factor to determine whether a person has entered the country illegally); Elias, *supra* note 148, at 1156 (“[I]n the twenty-five years since *Lopez-Mendoza*, the legal and political landscape has shifted so radically and the situation of immigration respondents has changed so markedly that each of [the] three foundational precepts [set forth in *Lopez-Mendoza*] no longer applies.”); Kevin R. Johnson, *How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering*, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1007 (2010) (suggesting that racial profiling, while frowned upon in the criminal context, has long been a feature of immigration enforcement).

209. See *Whren v. United States*, 517 U.S. 806, 811–13 (1996) (declaring that the Supreme Court’s prior decisions clearly show that subjective intentions or ulterior motives cannot invalidate police conduct in probable cause Fourth Amendment analysis). Despite this general limitation, some courts have found that the fruits of searches motivated by racial bias may be suppressed where the violation is sufficiently “egregious” to implicate “fundamental fairness.” See, e.g., *Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales*, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006) (asserting that “exclusion of evidence is appropriate under the rule of *Lopez-Mendoza* if record evidence established either (a) that an egregious violation that was fundamentally unfair had occurred, or (b) that the violation—regardless of its egregiousness or unfairness—undermined the reliability of the evidence in dispute”); *Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS*, 22 F.3d 1441, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the stop and seizure of a vehicle driven by a deportee constituted a “bad faith and egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment” requiring suppression of the evidence obtained as a result of the stop).

created affirmative incentives for officers to engage in disparate treatment of racial minorities.²¹⁰ Sadly, these worries are not abstract or hypothetical.²¹¹ For example, the Department of Justice (DOJ) recently concluded that the East Haven, Connecticut Police Department engages in biased policing against Latinos in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.²¹² Likewise, the DOJ concluded that police in Maricopa County, Arizona, routinely engage in unconstitutional profiling of Latinos leading to unlawful stops, arrests, and detentions.²¹³

These concerns have taken on more weight in the wake of recent decisions by some circuit courts allowing law enforcement to admit illegally seized evidence at a criminal trial if the evidence is the fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation motivated by an interest in civil removal rather than criminal investigation.²¹⁴ For example, in *United States v. Oscar-Torres*,²¹⁵ North Carolina police officers working in concert with ICE agents arrested Oscar-Torres without any reasonable, particularized suspicion of illegal activity.²¹⁶ Agents took Oscar-Torres to ICE headquarters, where he was

210. This is not at all far-fetched. For example, Alabama police arrested a Japanese auto executive, who was on assignment at a local Honda plant, at a roadblock even though he had his passport and an international driver's license. Arian Campo-Flores & Miriam Jordan, *Alabama Immigration Law Ensnarers Auto Workers*, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2011, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204397704577070811936737218.html>.

211. As Devon Carbado and Cheryl Harris have noted, the Department of Justice guidelines on racial profiling permit officers to use race in deciding whether to make investigatory stops at the border. Carbado & Harris, *supra* note 170, at 1607; *see also* CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 9 (2003), *available at* http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/guidance_on_race.pdf (discussing how a person's alienage is of concern in national border protection and thus suggesting that race may be considered to the extent the Constitution allows).

212. For a summary of those findings, see Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Joseph Maturo, Jr., Mayor, Town of East Haven 2–3 (Dec. 19, 2011), *available at* http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/easthaven_findletter_12-19-11.pdf.

213. *See* Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Bill Montgomery, Cnty. Att'y, Maricopa Cnty. 2 (Dec. 15, 2011), *available at* http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf (“Specifically, we find that MCSO, through the actions of its deputies, supervisory staff, and command staff, engages in racial profiling of Latinos; unlawfully stops, detains, and arrests Latinos; and unlawfully retaliates against individuals who complain about or criticize MCSO's policies or practices, all in violation of Section 14141.”).

214. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Farias-Gonzalez*, 556 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2009) (refusing to suppress the contents of the defendant's INS alien file in a criminal prosecution); *United States v. Oscar-Torres*, 507 F.3d 224, 232 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that fingerprints obtained for an administrative purpose not related to a criminal investigation are not subject to exclusion); *United States v. Olivares-Rangel*, 458 F.3d 1104, 1116 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that fingerprints obtained as part of routine booking and processing procedure are admissible evidence but that fingerprints collected to connect the defendant to additional alleged illegal activity are subject to suppression); *United States v. Bowley*, 435 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that evidence obtained from a defendant's immigration file following an illegal arrest is not subject to suppression unless an “egregious” Fourth Amendment violation has occurred); *United States v. Garcia-Beltran*, 389 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that fingerprints collected to establish a defendant's identity but not used to investigate alleged criminal activity are admissible).

215. 507 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2007).

216. *Id.* at 226–27.

fingerprinted.²¹⁷ When his fingerprints were run through an FBI database, officers discovered that Oscar-Torres had previously been deported.²¹⁸ At a subsequent criminal trial, where he was charged with illegal reentry under 18 U.S.C. § 1326(a),²¹⁹ Oscar-Torres moved to suppress his fingerprints as the fruits of an illegal arrest.²²⁰ The Fourth Circuit, relying in part on *Lopez-Mendoza*, held that the identification evidence should be suppressed if the law enforcement officers' primary purpose in gathering that evidence was to investigate possible criminal conduct, but should not be suppressed if their primary purpose was to gather evidence of civil immigration violations.²²¹ The court then remanded for further fact-finding on the motivations of the offending officers.²²² "If," the court wrote, "illegally obtained evidence that law enforcement officers intend to use in civil deportation hearings cannot be suppressed because exclusion will not effectively deter unlawful arrests, as *Lopez-Mendoza* holds, then suppressing that evidence in an unanticipated and unforeseen criminal prosecution surely cannot provide any additional *ex ante* deterrence."²²³

Oscar-Torres and similar precedents layer one silver platter doctrine upon another. The Supreme Court in *Lopez-Mendoza* created a new silver platter doctrine that allows the government to make free use of illegally seized evidence in civil removal proceedings. In the years since that case was decided, civil immigration enforcement has increasingly become a primary concern for law enforcement officers at all levels. Because the exclusionary rule does not bar admission of illegally seized evidence from civil removal proceedings, officers interested in detecting immigration violations have every motivation to effect suspicionless searches and seizures because they know that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule will not frustrate their primary interests.²²⁴ Furthermore, they now know that if they violate the Fourth Amendment out of an apparent interest in civil immigration enforcement, and happen upon evidence of criminal activity in the process, then the combination of the *Lopez-Mendoza* silver platter

217. *Id.* at 226.

218. *Id.*

219. Prosecutions for violations of § 1326(a) are far and away the most common in the federal system, comprising fully 23% of the criminal docket in federal courts. See *DHS Referred Most Federal Criminal Prosecutions in October 2011*, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Jan. 26, 2012), <http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/271/> (noting § 1326 charges were the most commonly recorded lead charge in October 2011 and October 2006); *Illegal Reentry Becomes Top Criminal Charge*, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (June 10, 2011), <http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/251/> (stating § 1326 charges were the most commonly recorded lead charge in the first half of 2011).

220. *Oscar-Torres*, 507 F.3d at 226.

221. *Id.* at 231–32.

222. *Id.* at 232.

223. *Id.* at 231 (internal citation omitted).

224. See Eagly, *supra* note 170, at 1340–42 (chronicling two cases where a court allowed seemingly inadmissible evidence in a criminal proceeding because law enforcement had collected it as part of an administrative proceeding and in accordance with administrative procedures).

doctrine, the spectacular non sequitur, and the *Oscar-Torres* silver platter doctrine, will allow them to use that illegally seized evidence at a subsequent criminal trial. Thus, while *Lopez-Mendoza* incentivizes Fourth Amendment violations by providing an alternate venue for tainted evidence, subsequent circuit cases decided in its wake have now opened a back door for admitting that evidence in criminal forums. We cannot imagine a more chilling example of the pathological potential of the incentives created by the silver platter doctrine.

The policies and practices encouraged by this perfect storm of silver platter doctrines and enforcement policy take little imagination to picture but certainly shock the conscience. If an officer sees anyone who looks to her like someone who could be foreign because of complexion, phenotype, accent, clothing, or demeanor, then she has no incentive not to stop him, arrest him, fingerprint him, and inventory his possessions as part of an administrative process to confirm his immigration status.²²⁵ If nothing turns up, then she can release him with apologies. However, she also knows that any evidence she discovers will be admissible not only at a removal hearing, but also at a criminal trial as long as she can plausibly show that her conduct constituted reasonable steps taken to enforce civil immigration laws. There is always the threat of a lawsuit, of course, but our officer knows that these suits are vanishingly unlikely to be filed and that, if they are, then qualified immunity and insignificant damages awards make them unlikely to come to much.²²⁶ She has, in short, little or no reason to respect the Fourth Amendment in any circumstance where immigration matters are or plausibly may be concerned. In some respects, to do so would be irrational given her goals and incentives. In our view, the only way to resolve this absurd state of the law, and to prevent inevitable injustices, is to follow the Court's lead in *Elkins* by revoking the silver platter doctrine and thereby eliminating compelling incentives to violate the Fourth Amendment.²²⁷

C. *Parole Revocation Proceedings*

Misunderstandings of the pathological law enforcement incentives created by contemporary silver platter doctrines continued to plague the

225. See Carbado & Harris, *supra* note 170, at 1546–50, 1597–602. After *Arizona v. United States*, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), states cannot pass laws requiring that police officers effect stops based solely on immigration concerns because doing so infringes federal supremacy in immigration matters, but 287(g) programs fill that gap nicely. At any rate, the whole point of the silver platter doctrine is that it removes disincentives for officers to engage in unconstitutional conduct. Even without direct authority under state law, a police officer who takes it upon himself to aggressively pursue those he believes to be illegal immigrants knows that his goals will not be frustrated even if he violates the Fourth Amendment, the Supremacy Clause, or any other constitutional constraint on his conduct.

226. See Laurin, *supra* note 20, at 674–76 (discussing “remedial diminishment” in Fourth Amendment doctrine and the use of qualified immunity to narrow the exclusionary rule’s reach).

227. In arguing that the exclusionary rule should apply in civil immigration proceedings, we join Stella Elias, among others. See Elias, *supra* note 148, at 1115.

Court in *Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott*,²²⁸ where it held that the exclusionary rule does not bar admission of illegally seized evidence in probation and parole revocation hearings.²²⁹ Scott pleaded *nolo contendere* in 1983 to a charge of third-degree murder and was released on parole in 1993.²³⁰ Five months later, parole officers searched his home without a warrant, consent, or a claim of emergency.²³¹ During that search they discovered several firearms, possession of which constituted a violation of Scott's terms of release.²³² At a subsequent revocation hearing, Scott objected on Fourth Amendment grounds to admission of the guns into evidence.²³³ His request was denied and his parole was revoked.²³⁴ He appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which granted him relief, holding that the scheme for regulating searches of parolees and probationers administered by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole failed to provide sufficient protections for even the limited Fourth Amendment rights afforded to parolees under its supervision.²³⁵ Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, reversed.²³⁶

According to the *Scott* Court, enforcing the exclusionary rule in parole hearings would serve no deterrent purpose because offending officers are generally "unaware that the subject[s] of [their] search[es] [are parolees]."²³⁷ In this circumstance, Justice Thomas wrote, "the officer will likely be searching for evidence of criminal conduct with an eye toward the introduction of the evidence at a criminal trial."²³⁸ "The likelihood," he

228. 524 U.S. 357 (1998).

229. *Id.* at 357–58. To clarify terms, "probation" usually refers to a constraint on freedom enforced as a sentence in itself. "Parole" usually refers to a constraint on freedom enforced as a condition of early release from a prison term. Although the Court in *Scott* was confronted with a parolee, subsequent courts have assumed that *Scott* applies equally to probation revocation hearings. *See, e.g.,* *United States v. Armstrong*, 187 F.3d 392, 394–95 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that "[f]or purposes of the rule established in *Scott* . . . parole and supervised release are not just analogous, but virtually indistinguishable" because "the costs and benefits of applying the exclusionary rule to revocation proceedings are almost identical" in these contexts). *But see* *State v. Scarlet*, 800 So. 2d 220, 221–22 (Fla. 2001) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to probation revocation hearings because they are very different from parole revocation hearings); *Logan v. Commonwealth*, 666 S.E.2d 346, 347 (Va. 2008) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to probation revocation hearings when an officer acts in bad faith).

230. *Scott*, 524 U.S. at 359–60.

231. *Id.* at 360. Immediately following his arrest, Scott gave the law enforcement officers keys to his home, which was owned by his mother. *Id.* The officers waited for his mother to arrive before searching. *Id.* While the officers did not request or receive consent to search, Scott's mother did show them to her son's bedroom. *Id.*

232. *Id.* at 360–61.

233. *Id.* at 360.

234. *Id.* at 360–61.

235. *Id.* at 361–62.

236. *Id.* at 359.

237. *Id.* at 367.

238. *Id.*

continued, “that illegally obtained evidence will be excluded from trial provides deterrence against Fourth Amendment violations, and the remote possibility that the subject is a parolee and that the evidence may be admitted at a parole revocation proceeding surely has little, if any, effect on the officer’s incentives.”²³⁹ Because parole revocation is “outside the . . . zone of primary interest” for most police officers, the Court could not see any reason to think that enforcing the exclusionary rule in parole hearings would result in appreciable deterrence of law enforcement.²⁴⁰ As for parole officers who do know parolees’ statuses, the Court saw no reason to believe that the exclusionary rule would affect them because parole officers are not “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”²⁴¹ Both views indulge the spectacular non sequitur and therefore misunderstand law enforcement officers’ motives²⁴² and the effects on general deterrence wrought by creating another silver platter doctrine.

First, to again paraphrase H.L.A. Hart, it may be true that the threat of excluding evidence from a parole revocation hearing will not deter an officer entirely ignorant of the possibility that his investigation might lead to that forum.²⁴³ It does not follow, however, that actually enforcing suppression in such a circumstance would not result in greater overall compliance with the Fourth Amendment by that officer and other officers than is accomplished by creating this exception.

Second, it is demonstrably wrong that law enforcement officers are not motivated by an interest in prosecuting parole and probation violations. In fact, police and prosecutors in many jurisdictions focus on parole and probation violations as a primary law enforcement goal. Others have designated special task forces that target parole and probation violators.²⁴⁴ It

239. *Id.*

240. *Id.* at 368 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

241. *Id.* (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

242. *Cf.* Bloom & Fentin, *supra* note 3, at 63, 67–70 (discussing law enforcement officers’ incentives for violating the Fourth Amendment).

243. *See supra* note 110 and accompanying text.

244. *See* Jordan Guin, *Eight Law Enforcement Agencies Conduct Parole and Probation Searches*, LODI NEWS-SENTINEL, May 21, 2011, http://www.lodinews.com/news/article_34eaea0d-bdcc-584e-9790-a5bcfc7dc5c8.html (detailing a task force performing parole and probation sweeps); *see also* STATE OF N.J., EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT FY 2011 FORMULA PROGRAM (2011), *available at* http://www.state.nj.us/lps/crimeplan/pdfs/JAG-2011_Program-Narrative_Attachment-1.pdf (reporting on a New Jersey program targeting parolees and probationers); WIS. DEP’T. OF CORRECTIONS, THE 2008/2009 STUDY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE REVOCATION (2009), *available at* http://www.wi-doc.com/PDF_Files/Revocation%20Study_Full%20Report%20-%20FINAL.pdf (examining parole enforcement policy); *Attorney General Cooper Calls for Giving Probation Data to Law Enforcement*, ISLAND GAZETTE, May 6, 2008, http://www.islandgazette.net/news-server1/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4621:attorney-general-cooper-calls-for-giving-probation-data-to-law-enforcement&catid=18:crime&Itemid=70 (explaining that North Carolina’s Attorney General set a policy of keeping closer track of parolees); *Hope Probation*, HAW. ST. JUDICIARY, http://www.courts.state.hi.us/special_projects/hope/about_hope_probation.html (describing Hawai’i’s high-intensity supervision program).

is easy to see why they would.²⁴⁵ After all, the burden of proof in revocation hearings is much lower and there are fewer procedural safeguards.²⁴⁶ By contrast, the terms of incarceration at stake are often quite long.²⁴⁷ Just as was the case in *Elkins*, these incentives to violate the Fourth Amendment undermine efforts to secure Fourth Amendment protections in a “particularly . . . ironic way.”²⁴⁸ In particular, the silver platter doctrine created by *Scott* licenses policies that encourage officers to routinely violate the Fourth Amendment with the goal of prosecuting parole violations.²⁴⁹ This *bête noire* is all the darker for the likelihood that such policies almost certainly target poor and minority populations in practice.²⁵⁰

Third, it is wrong to suggest that parole officers are not engaged in detecting and prosecuting crime. Quite to the contrary, as the Court pointed out in *Samson v. California*,²⁵¹ one of parole officers' primary duties is to detect, document, and prosecute through the parole system crimes committed

245. As Christopher Slobogin has pointed out: “In a large number of cases involving questionable stops and searches, the police do not make an arrest, either because they never intended to do so or because they find nothing” Slobogin, *supra* note 130, at 374–75 (footnote omitted). With the promise that any evidence seized will at least be admissible in a parole hearing, officers have every incentive to engage in patently illegal searches in neighborhoods and among populations where their targets are statistically more likely to be on parole or probation.

246. *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972).

247. In 2009, 658,800 parolees were on parole for one year or more, while only 33,579 were on parole for less than one year. LAUREN E. GLAZE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 231674, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009, at 40 app. tbl.19 (2010) [hereinafter PROBATION AND PAROLE 2009]. This means that over 80% of parolees had a year or more sentence left to serve in prison if their parole was violated.

248. *Elkins v. United States*, 364 U.S. 206, 221–22 (1960).

249. Justice Jackson, fresh from his stint as chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, pointed out the consequences of such police practices, noting that “[u]ncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.” *Brinegar v. United States*, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). He went on to observe that “one need only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to know that the human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police.” *Id.* at 180–81.

250. *See, e.g.*, ROBERT S. WARSHAW, TENTH QUARTERLY REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR FOR THE OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT 32, 55–57 (2012) (finding that the Oakland Police Department is routinely omitting the “reason for encounter” in reports of stops, that “the number of searches of persons within one sub-group is significantly higher than others,” and highlighting the fact that all “six arrests that were directly related to a subject’s status as a parolee or probationer” during the reporting period involved black or Hispanic arrestees); *see also* Sam J. Ervin, Jr., *The Exclusionary Rule: An Essential Ingredient of the Fourth Amendment*, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 297. As Carol Steiker has pointed out, the fact of historical and contemporary racial bias in law enforcement has played a central role in the courts’ treatment of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule. Carol S. Steiker, *Second Thoughts About First Principles*, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 838–44 (1994). The simple fact that Fourth Amendment violations are a matter of routine for poor and minority citizens puts the lie to claims made by Richard Posner and others that “the typical [Fourth Amendment] violation consists not of harassment of the innocent but of overzealous enforcement against the guilty.” Richard A. Posner, *Rethinking the Fourth Amendment*, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 59; *see also infra* notes 292–93 and accompanying text.

251. 547 U.S. 843 (2006).

by their charges.²⁵² In *Minnesota v. Murphy*,²⁵³ the Supreme Court also pointed out that parole officers are “peace officer[s], and as such [are] allied, to a greater or lesser extent, with [their] fellow peace officers.”²⁵⁴ Given their aligned interests, it is no surprise that parole officers routinely cooperate with police and other law enforcement officials.²⁵⁵ Although admirable in the abstract, these close working relationships raise serious Fourth Amendment concerns after *Scott*.

The original silver platter doctrine was limited. If the state agents worked with or at the direction of federal agents when violating the Fourth Amendment, then the silver platter doctrine did not apply and the evidence would be excluded in federal court.²⁵⁶ There is no such limitation on the silver platter doctrine created by the Court in *Scott*. The Court therefore left the door open for police and other law enforcement agents to recruit parole officials to an ever greater degree into their “competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,” where there are powerful incentives for them to proceed without regard to, or even with contumacious disregard of, Fourth Amendment rights.²⁵⁷ Here, again, the only remedy is the one prescribed by the Court in *Elkins*: to revoke the silver platter doctrine.

One might respond to these concerns by pointing to the Court’s contention in *Scott* that parole revocation cannot be a primary driver for law enforcement because police do not know *ex ante* that a citizen whose rights are being violated is a parolee or probationer. This is naïve. “[L]ocal police know the local felons”²⁵⁸ They also know where the centers of criminal activity are in their jurisdictions and therefore can place pretty good bets that a substantial proportion of citizens found on some street corners or in some bars are on parole or probation.²⁵⁹ It is also an unfortunate truth that, due to a

252. *Id.* at 849–50.

253. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).

254. *Id.* at 432.

255. *See* Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. *Scott*, 524 U.S. 357, 373–74 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that “police and parole officers routinely cooperate” and discussing cases in which such cooperation took place).

256. *Byars v. United States*, 273 U.S. 28, 33–34 (1927).

257. *See, e.g.*, ALASKA DEP’T OF CORR., PROBATION OFFICER AND PRIVATE PERSON SEARCHES (2009), available at <http://www.dps.state.ak.us/APSC/docs/legalmanual/NPROBATIONOFFICERSANDPRIVATEPERSONSEARCHES.pdf> (“As a condition of parole or probation, the Court may order that the defendant subject his person, residence or vehicle to searches that will be conducted by his/her probation officers.”).

258. *Scott*, 524 U.S. at 373 (Souter, J., dissenting); *see, e.g.*, *People v. Stewart*, 610 N.E.2d 197, 206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (detailing the police officer’s knowledge that the victim of an illegal traffic stop and search was on probation). The electronic monitoring industry has expanded since the mid-1980s, making it all the more likely that local police know the whereabouts of local felons. By 2003, Texas, Florida, and New Jersey all used global positioning satellites (GPS) to track parolees’ moves. JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 194 (2003).

259. For another plausible solution, see Martha Worner, Note, Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. *Scott*: *The Taking of a Parolee’s Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy*, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 1115, 1144–48 (1999). Worner proposes adoption of the awareness standard, under which an

host of social factors, a higher proportion of citizens who live in poor and minority neighborhoods are on parole or probation than those who live in affluent white neighborhoods.²⁶⁰ Therefore, even where a police officer's first-line goal is to detect and prosecute a crime rather than to revoke parole or probation, the collateral pathway for admission of illegally seized evidence created by the Court in *Scott* provides police with a critical safety net for a general practice of aggressive searches that cross the Fourth Amendment line if the victims are poor, minorities, or both.

This last concern cannot be overstated. Although the targets of unreasonable searches may sometimes be parolees and probationers, the incentives created by *Scott* are indiscriminate. It is therefore easy to imagine police adopting a de facto or even explicit strategy of routine Fourth Amendment violations in many urban centers or along many rural byways. Take New York City as an example. According to official records, New York City police officers conducted a record 684,000 "stops and frisks" in 2011.²⁶¹ Only 12% of these stops resulted in arrest, raising serious concern for the constitutionality of the remainder.²⁶² More disturbing still is that 87% of those stopped were black or Hispanic.²⁶³

As was made clear in *United States v. Payner*,²⁶⁴ the contemporary silver platter doctrines preclude any aversions the Court might otherwise have to these kinds of policies. *Payner* involved an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) investigation of American citizens suspected of hiding income in offshore banks and what came to be known as "the briefcase affair."²⁶⁵ Frustrated by a lack of progress in the investigation, IRS Special Agent Richard Jaffe recruited an informant named Norman Casper to obtain bank records from Michael Wolstencroft, an employee of one of the suspect banks, while Wolstencroft was in the United States on business.²⁶⁶ According to their plan, Casper hired a woman named Sybil Kennedy to seduce and distract Wolstencroft so he could steal documents from Wolstencroft's

officer's illegal search and seizure would be subject to exclusion if he was aware that the suspect was on parole. *Id.* at 1144–45. Worner argues that the awareness standard would further the Court's deterrence objective, while maintaining integrity in parole-search practices. *Id.* at 1147–48.

260. In the 2010 Census, about 14% of the population identified themselves as "black." BLACK POPULATION, *supra* note 30, at 3 tbl.1. However, a disproportionate 39% of the parole population in 2010 was black. PROBATION AND PAROLE 2010, *supra* note 30, at 43 app. tbl.15. Although whites constituted about 75% of the entire United States population in 2010, they only made up 42% of the parole population. WHITE POPULATION, *supra* note 30, at 3 tbl.1; PROBATION AND PAROLE 2010, *supra* note 30, at 43 app. tbl.15.

261. Sean Gardiner, *Stop-and-Frisks Hit Record in 2011*, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2012, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204795304577221770752633612.html>.

262. *Id.*

263. *Id.*

264. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).

265. *See id.* at 729–31; *United States v. Payner*, 434 F. Supp. 113, 118–22 (N.D. Ohio 1977), *rev'd*, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); *United States v. Baskes*, 433 F. Supp. 799, 801–02 (N.D. Ill. 1977).

266. *Payner*, 434 F. Supp. at 118–19.

briefcase.²⁶⁷ Kennedy subsequently arranged a date with Wolstencroft and persuaded him to leave his briefcase in her apartment when they went out to dinner.²⁶⁸ While they were out, Casper stole Wolstencroft's briefcase²⁶⁹ and worked with an IRS-recommended locksmith to fabricate a key.²⁷⁰ Casper then rendezvoused with IRS agents, opened the briefcase, and waited while they made photocopies of its contents.²⁷¹ Among the documents they copied were papers showing that Payner had deposited unreported income.²⁷²

This operation was not the work of rogue agents. To the contrary, the agents involved sought and received prior approval from their supervisors and in-house attorneys.²⁷³ Although illegal, the operation received approval because the agents and their legal advisors knew that they were violating the Fourth Amendment rights of the bank employee, not his clients, and that, therefore, the clients would not have "standing" to object to admission of the illegally seized evidence if they were subsequently prosecuted.²⁷⁴

Faced with these facts the district court found that:

It is evident that the Government and its agents . . . were, and are, well aware that under the standing requirement of the Fourth Amendment, evidence obtained from a party pursuant to an unconstitutional search is admissible against third parties [whose] own privacy expectations are not subject to the search, even though the cause for the unconstitutional search was to obtain evidence incriminating those third parties. This Court finds that, in its desire to apprehend tax evaders, a desire the Court fully shares, the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual in order to obtain evidence against third parties, who are the real targets of the governmental intrusion, and that the IRS agents in this case acted, and will act in the future, according to that counsel.²⁷⁵

267. *Id.*; see also *Baskes*, 433 F. Supp. at 801 ("Casper arranged an assignation for Wolstencroft with a certain Sybil Kennedy.").

268. *Baskes*, 433 F. Supp. at 801 ("Ms. Kennedy succeeded in getting Wolstencroft to leave his briefcase, containing the desired documents, in her apartment. She then detained Wolstencroft outside the apartment during a dinner engagement, and engaged in sexual intercourse for compensation."). According to facts found by the district court in *Payner*, the plan originally approved by Jaffe entailed both burglary and theft. *Payner*, 434 F. Supp. at 119 n.15. As it turned out, no unlawful entry was necessary because Kennedy provided Casper with a key to her apartment. *Id.* at 119.

269. *Payner*, 434 F. Supp. at 130 n.66.

270. *Id.* at 119–20.

271. *Id.*

272. See *id.* at 122.

273. *Payner*, 447 U.S. at 739 (Marshall, J., dissenting); *Payner*, 434 F. Supp. at 119, 121 n.40; see also *Payner*, 447 U.S. at 730 (quoting the trial court's finding that, "the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual in order to obtain evidence against third parties").

274. *Payner*, 447 U.S. at 730.

275. *Payner*, 434 F. Supp. at 132–33.

Based on its finding that the rule on standing was being affirmatively exploited by government agents to engage in searches they knew to be illegal, the district court granted Payner's motions to suppress in order "to signal all likeminded individuals that purposeful criminal acts on behalf of the Government will not be tolerated in this country and that such acts shall never be allowed to bear fruit."²⁷⁶

Given its deterrence concerns and frequent condemnation of flagrant Fourth Amendment violations, one would have expected the Supreme Court to affirm. It did not. Rather, it reversed on the ground that the bank employee was the only person with standing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim and that, as a general rule, granting the remedy of exclusion to parties with standing is sufficient to deter law enforcement officers from violating the Fourth Amendment.²⁷⁷ Leaving aside the fact that *Payner* itself demonstrated the folly of that hope,²⁷⁸ the Court's holding, combined with its holding in *Scott*, opens the door for law enforcement officers to adopt policies of routinely violating the Fourth Amendment in neighborhoods inhabited by our most vulnerable citizens knowing that, even if illegally seized evidence is not admissible in a criminal trial, it will be available to pursue the revocation of someone's parole or probation.²⁷⁹

There is good evidence that many of these fears have come to pass and that law enforcement increasingly is pursuing parole violations as a primary law enforcement objective in order to circumnavigate the Fourth Amendment. The Bureau of Justice Statistics publishes annual bulletins regarding probation and parole statistics in the United States. In 2010 there were 840,676 people on parole in the United States.²⁸⁰ That same year 127,918 parolees returned to prison via revocation, while only 49,334 returned on new convictions.²⁸¹ This marks a dramatic shift from 1980, when only 27,000 parolees had their parole revoked.²⁸² Part of this increase is a consequence of an extraordinary increase in background incarceration rates—the number of parolees who returned to prison in 2000 is roughly

276. *Id.* at 130–31.

277. *Payner*, 447 U.S. at 739–42 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

278. See Gray, *supra* note 19, at 74 (summarizing the District Court's findings that "the rule on standing was being affirmatively exploited").

279. There is, of course, the possibility that such a policy might be the target of a civil action. Unfortunately, as Jennifer Laurin has recently pointed out, the threat of civil sanction in Fourth Amendment cases against individual officers or their agencies is far too weak to provide much discouragement. See Laurin, *supra* note 20, at 712–13 (explaining that the Court has limited the potential rights-expanding power of civil remedies by adopting limitations from constitutional tort doctrine).

280. PROBATION AND PAROLE 2010, *supra* note 30, at 40 app. tbl.12.

281. *Id.* at 42 app. tbl.14. While this is less than the total in 2000, the overall parole population decreased between 2000 and 2010. *Id.* at 2.

282. JEREMY TRAVIS & SARAH LAWRENCE, BEYOND THE PRISON GATES: THE STATE OF PAROLE IN AMERICA 21 (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310583_Beyond_prison_gates.pdf.

equal to the total number of state prisoners in 1980.²⁸³ But the trend toward parole revocation as a primary law enforcement strategy is evident even in relative terms. For example, in 1980 only 17% of the prison population consisted of parole violators, but that proportion had risen to 35% by 1999.²⁸⁴ During approximately that same twenty-year span, the number of people sent to prison on new convictions tripled, but the number of parolees who returned to prison after revocation increased a staggering sevenfold.²⁸⁵ That trend has continued apace in subsequent years,²⁸⁶ encouraged as it has been by the contemporary silver platter doctrine.²⁸⁷

The results of a recent investigation of the Oakland Police Department²⁸⁸ offer a disturbing case study documenting the consequences of the silver platter doctrine created by *Scott*. One anecdote tells the story. According to facts recounted in the report, officers conducting a narcotics investigation found out that a subject who allegedly sold drugs to a confidential informant was on probation.²⁸⁹ The officers were aware that the subject was not listed as a probationer in another database.²⁹⁰ Although the investigation likely produced ample information to establish probable cause for a warrant, the investigating officers elected to conduct a warrantless search of the subject's residence instead.²⁹¹ When asked why they did not seek a search warrant, the sergeant in charge replied that "the use of the probation search granted the officers broader scope to search within the residence."²⁹² The subject filed a claim alleging illegal search, excessive force, and evidence planting.²⁹³

This account was published in a report by Robert Warshaw, the Independent Monitor for the Oakland Police Department, who is charged with observing the department's compliance with fifty-one reform measures mandated by a consent decree.²⁹⁴ Although it was not part of his core

283. *Id.*

284. *Id.* at 22.

285. *See id.* at 21, 24 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS (NPS-1) SERIES) (emphasizing the explosive growth in parole violations from 1980 to 2000). For a full list of Bureau of Justice Statistics sources used in this report, see *id.* at 3. Based on Figure 15 of this report, approximately 25,000 prisoners returned to prison in 1980, and just under 200,000 returned in 2000. *Id.* at 21 fig.15.

286. PAUL GUERINO ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 236096, PRISONERS IN 2010, at 25 app. tbl.11 (2011).

287. *See* Worner, *supra* note 259, at 1138–40 (offering an illustration of the operation of the silver platter doctrine in the parolee context).

288. ROBERT S. WARSHAW, EIGHTH QUARTERLY REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR FOR THE OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT (2012).

289. *Id.* at 87–88.

290. *Id.* at 88.

291. *Id.*

292. *Id.*

293. *Id.*

294. *See* Aaron Sankin, *Oakland Police Department Only Weeks Away From Being Placed into Federal Control*, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 27, 2012, 7:20 PM), <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/>

reporting responsibilities, in his Eighth Quarterly Report from January 2012, Warsaw added, on his own initiative, an appendix analyzing searches and seizures of parolees and probationers.²⁹⁵ Warsaw reported that a disproportionate number of blacks were represented in these samples. For example, 91% of the parolees or probationers stopped or arrested were black.²⁹⁶ Another set of statistics suggested that law enforcement was scouring the city and confronting people in the hopes that they were on parole or probation. In one sample, 69% of approached subjects either acknowledged that they were on probation or parole when asked or the officers already knew the subject's status.²⁹⁷ Eighty-six percent of these subjects were searched, but only a very few were arrested.²⁹⁸ Of these stops, 9% led to warrantless searches of residences.²⁹⁹ Warsaw continued to notice perverse practices concerning arrests of parolees and probationers in subsequent reporting periods.³⁰⁰

Based on his study, Warsaw concluded that Oakland police officers were relying excessively on searches of parolees or probationers and that racial minorities were too frequently the targets.³⁰¹ He in fact found that officers routinely asked citizens about their status as parolees or probationers during casual encounters and stops without obvious justification, save for an interest in searching.³⁰² Although this is but one example, there is no reason to believe that these practices are not occurring across the United States. A central problem, of course, is a lack of oversight and accountability. Because the exclusionary rule does not apply, Fourth Amendment issues are not litigated in parole proceedings and the circumstances of searches are therefore not published or made available to the public. It is only because of

2012/01/27/oakland-police-department_n_1237785.html (“In 2000, a rogue group of Oakland police officers, calling themselves the ‘Rough Riders,’ were found to have planted evidence, used excessive force and falsified police reports. As part of a negotiated settlement three years later, the city was ordered to take 51 specific steps toward reform or else lose operational control of the department.”).

295. WARSHAW, *supra* note 288, at 84–89.

296. *Id.* at 84.

297. *Id.* at 85.

298. *Id.*

299. *Id.*

300. During the reporting period for the Tenth Quarterly Report, Warsaw identified six arrests that were “directly related to a subject’s status as a parolee or probationer.” ROBERT S. WARSHAW, TENTH QUARTERLY REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR FOR THE OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT 32 (2012). Five of the six subjects were black, and one was Hispanic. *Id.* These encounters led to searches of the subjects’ person in all six incidents, as well as searches of three of their residences. *Id.* Another led to the warrantless search of a residence that appeared to have no connection to the arrestee or the encounter that led to his arrest. *Id.* During that incursion, police drew their weapons on a woman and her two-year-old child who likewise do not appear to have had any connection to the arrestee. *Id.*

301. WARSHAW, *supra* note 288, at 89.

302. *Id.* Warsaw opined that “[these] practice[s] can have a chilling effect on police-community relations, and resentment over these inquires can—and does—result in citizen complaints.” *Id.*

Warshaw's entrepreneurial scrutiny of the violations in Oakland that we have any record at all.³⁰³

VII. Conclusion

In addition to the grand jury, removal proceedings, and parole revocation hearings, the Court has established two other silver platter doctrines, one for civil tax suits³⁰⁴ and the other for habeas corpus petitions.³⁰⁵ Neither need delay us very long here. *United States v. Payner*, the facts of which are set forth in the previous Part, gives lie to any claim that providing a silver platter doctrine allowing illegally seized evidence to be admitted in civil tax proceedings will not encourage Fourth Amendment violations. Quite to the contrary, as the facts in *Payner* show, IRS agents will go to great lengths, even to the point of engaging in criminal conduct, in order to secure evidence of tax violations. Habeas corpus petitions, because they lie behind criminal prosecutions as a procedural matter, probably are comparatively more remote for most law enforcement officers, but the Court nevertheless does indulge the spectacular non sequitur when arguing that suppression in these proceedings will not add to the general deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule.

This, then, is where we will rest our provocations in this Article: each of the new silver platter doctrines created by the Court since *Calandra* is built on a spectacular non sequitur and therefore creates perverse incentives. They also have a cumulative effect that dramatically diminishes the force and efficacy of the exclusionary rule. As Professors Mertens and Wasserstrom have pointed out, exploitation of these opportunities by law enforcement need not be conscious in order to put Fourth Amendment rights at risk: "Although the police may not be thinking about any particular one of these permissible collateral uses of unlawfully-seized evidence, they may well go ahead with the unlawful search, confident that in one way or another it is likely to pay off."³⁰⁶

Those incentives are likely to have greater salience and to grant broader latitude if the citizens targeted are vulnerable. Just as an example, imagine an officer who sees two Hispanic men driving through a low-income, inner-city neighborhood with a reputation as a drug market. Without appealing to racial profiling, the officer cannot justify a stop, but he has a gut feeling and

303. More such reports of abuse are sure to come as activists increase their monitoring of law enforcement officers in coming years as provisions of state laws allowing local law enforcement officers to check the immigration status of suspects come into effect. See David Schwartz & Tim Gaynor, *Police Begin Enforcing Controversial Arizona Immigration Measure*, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2012, 11:00 PM), <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/20/us-usa-immigration-arizona-idUSBRE8811FB20120920> (describing how Arizona activists plan to continue challenging Arizona's law).

304. *United States v. Janis*, 428 U.S. 433, 459–60 (1976).

305. *Stone v. Powell*, 428 U.S. 465, 494–96 (1976).

306. Mertens & Wasserstrom, *supra* note 135, at 388.

stops the car anyway. During a subsequent search he discovers a small amount of marijuana. To borrow from Justice Marshall, in his “worst-case scenario,” our officer “will avoid a major expenditure of effort, ensure that the suspect will not escape,” and procures evidence that will be admissible in a subsequent grand jury proceeding, parole hearing, removal hearing, tax suit, or habeas litigation,³⁰⁷ even if it “cannot be used in the prosecution’s case in chief.”³⁰⁸ Not only is that not a bad outcome, it comes quite close to making respect for Fourth Amendment rights look irrational from the police officer’s point of view by “creat[ing] powerful incentives for police officers to violate the Fourth Amendment.”³⁰⁹

In the halcyon days of the exclusionary rule, when principled concerns reigned supreme, Justice Holmes wrote that “[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.”³¹⁰ The principles underlying that conclusion are as valid now as they were then. The Court rejected the original silver platter doctrine in *Elkins* on both utilitarian and principled grounds. The current Court ought to draw a lesson from its forebears and abandon its experimentation with modern-day silver platter doctrines, if not out of a commitment to consistency, then out of a commitment to logic, coherency, reasonableness, good sense, and the Fourth Amendment itself.

307. *New York v. Harris*, 495 U.S. 14, 32 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

308. *Id.*

309. *Id.*; see also Sharon L. Davies, *The Penalty of Exclusion—A Price or Sanction?*, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1319 (2000) (asserting that restrictions on the use of the exclusionary rule penalty “send a clear message that many constitutionally defective evidence-gathering acts will go unpunished” and noting that some police departments have taken this as a “‘green light’ to lawless action”).

310. *Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States*, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).